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JUST  AS  EVERYBODY  TALKS  ABOUT  the weather,  every economist  talks 
about endogenous  stabilization  policy, but nobody ever does anything 
about it. In recent  years,  the authors  of numerous  econometric  studies  of 
fiscal  and monetary  policy  have warned  that the policy  variables  that they 
treat  as exogenous  should  perhaps  be treated  as endogenous  if the stabiliza- 
tion authorities  were  pursuing  an active  countercyclical  policy during  the 
period  in question.  Typically,  the warning  is the last word on the subject; 
and so far as we know,  no efforts  have been  made  to investigate  the kinds 
of difficulties  this omission  may cause. 
The idea that the typical  stabilization  policy variables-federal  govern- 
ment  purchases  of goods and  services,  income  tax rates,  the monetary  base 
(or unborrowed  reserves),  the Federal  Reserve's  discount  rate,  and  so on- 
should  perhaps  be treated  as endogenous  in econometric  studies  raises  a 
host of issues  for the estimation  and use of macro  models.  In this  paper  we 
hope to say something  to three groups  who are interested  in the econo- 
metric  approach  to monetary  and fiscal  policies. 
* We wish to thank  our  colleagues  Gregory  C. Chow  and Dwight M. Jaffee  for helpful 
comments;  Joshua  Greene,  John Ortiz,  and Barry  Schwartz  for research  assistance;  and 
Ms. Betty Kaminski  for quality  typing under  duress. 
585 586  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1972 
For the first-a  single,  unified,  stabilization  authority-we have mostly 
good news.  We find  that,  if it follows  the conventional  structural  approach 
to econometric  model  building  and  estimation,  and  uses  the solved  reduced 
form to compute  multipliers,  the resulting  estimates  will probably  not err 
much even if stabilization  policies  have in the past been formulated  en- 
dogenously.  If, however,  the authority  should  adopt  the so-called  reduced- 
form method of estimating  multipliers-as exemplified  by the work of 
Andersen  and Jordan'-it may get a very  distorted  picture  indeed. 
Our second  ideal  type is an independent  stabilization  authority-say, a 
monetary  authority  that works  in relative  isolation  from  its fiscal  counter- 
part.  It, of course,  faces  the same  estimation  problems  as the single  policy 
maker.  But, given any estimated  model, it may have additional  difficulty 
in computing  multipliers  correctly  if the other authority  is reacting  en- 
dogenously  to economic  developments.  Such  an authority  may find  it very 
important  to estimate  the "reaction  function"  of the other and take this 
into account  in policy  making.  Failing  to do this,  it may  seriously  overstate 
the strength  of its own policy  instruments. 
Finally, we address  the outside economist  who wishes to analyze  the 
operation  and effectiveness  of historical  stabilization  policies. He has to 
worry  about the same estimation  biases.  But, more important,  if, during 
the period  he is studying,  the stabilization  authorities  were reacting  en- 
dogenously  to the course  of the economy,  it may  be crucial  for him to esti- 
mate  any systematic  reaction  patterns  that existed  and append  these  equa- 
tions to his econometric  model. Otherwise,  he may get a very  misleading 
picture  of the way fiscal  and monetary  policies  have worked  in the past. 
Framework  of the Analysis 
From all three  points of view, each of these  questions  can be illustrated 
best  by reference  to a trivial  macroeconomic  model.  This  model  should  not 
be interpreted  literally,  but rather  as representative  of any  structural  model 
in which there are control instruments  for each of two stabilization  au- 
thorities. 
1. Leonall C. Andersen  and Jerry  L. Jordan,  "Monetary  and Fiscal Actions: A Test 
of Their Relative Importance  in Economic Stabilization,"  Federal  Reserve  Bank of St. 
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Suppose  that national  income were determined  by a single stochastic 
behavior  equation  relating  consumption  (C) to income (Y), with u rep- 
resenting  the stochastic  element, 
(1)  C  =  a+bYt+ut, 
and an equilibrium  condition  stating  that income  must equal the sum of 
consumption,  investment  (I), and government  (G) demands: 
(2)  Yt =  Ct  +  It +  Gt. 
Assume  further  that government  purchases  of goods and services,  G,, are 
controlled  directly  by the fiscal authority,  and that investment  expendi- 
tures,  It, are controlled  directly  by the monetary  authority.  The problems 
considered  in this paper  arise  if the policy  instruments,  while  exogenous  in 
the economic  sense-that is, determined  outside  the framework  of equa- 
tions (1) and (2)-are  nevertheless  systematically  related  to some endoge- 
nous variables  in the model. The issues can be divided  into two classes: 
problems  in estimating  econometric  models, and problems  in using these 
estimates  to compute  policy  multipliers. 
PROBLEMS  IN  ESTIMATING  ECONOMETRIC  MODELS 
If an investigator's  ultimate  concern  lies with  policy  multipliers,  he might 
take one of two approaches  to estimation.  First, he might estimate  the 
marginal  propensity  to consume, b in equation (1), by some standard 
simultaneous-equations  technique,  and use this estimate  to construct  a 
multiplier.  This  is the conventional  structural  approach  that, in more  com- 
plex models,  involves  obtaining  multipliers  from  the solved  reduced  form. 
Second,  he might  solve (1) and (2) for what would  typically  be called  the 
reduced  form of this system: 
(3)  a  Gt  It.+  Yt  =  1 _b+  1+ Ib  1-b' 
estimate  this  by ordinary  least  squares,  and  use the estimated  coefficients  of 
Gt and It as his fiscal-  and monetary-policy  multipliers,  respectively.  This 
is the reduced-form  technique  of Andersen  and  Jordan  and others. 
Both methods  will yield satisfactory  results  if the policy variables  are 
exogenous  in the statistical  sense,  that is, uncorrelated  with  the error  term, 
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reasons  why G, and It might be correlated  with Ut.2  Consequently,  (3) 
would  not be a true  reduced-form  equation,  and attempts  to estimate  it by 
ordinary  least squares  would  yield  inconsistent  results.  In other  words,  the 
econometrician  would  commit  a specification  error  by treating  Gt  and It as 
exogenous  when  they  were  in fact  endogenous.  From  here  on, therefore,  we 
shall refer  to equations  like (3) as "partial  reduced  forms,"  to distinguish 
them from true  reduced  forms. 
This point made,  a question  arises  as to the meaning  and usefulness  of 
reduced-form  equations.  We explore  some of the difficulties  in interpreting 
these  kinds of results  in the sections  below.  In the next section  we seek to 
answer  the following  question:  If both the monetary  and fiscal  authorities 
formulated  policy endogenously,  what kind of results  would be obtained 
by an investigator  who used ordinary  least squares  to estimate  the partial 
reduced  form?  For the representative  class of simple reaction  functions 
that we consider,  it turns  out that fairly  definite  analytical  answers  can be 
established.  In particular,  interpreting  the estimated  partial  reduced-form 
coefficients  as policy  multipliers  can be extremely  misleading.  Typically,  an 
authority  that is conducting  an effective  stabilization  program  will appear 
to have a very small (and statistically  insignificant)  multiplier  in simple 
reduced-form  experiments,  and, conversely,  an ineffective  authority  will 
get a large  (and  statistically  significant)  multiplier.  What  these  results  point 
up is that  if we  knew  the  true  multipliers,  we could  use  the estimated  reduced 
forms  to assess  the relative  performances  of the monetary  and  fiscal  author- 
ities as stabilizers.  Alternatively,  if we  knew  the  behavior  patterns  of the two 
authorities,  we could use these  estimates  to compare  the sizes of the fiscal 
and monetary  multipliers.  If we know neither  of these a priori,  the coeffi- 
cients  of a partial  reduced-form  equation  hopelessly  entangle  the astuteness 
of the authorities  with the relative  sizes of the multipliers. 
Below we use Monte Carlo techniques  to explore  a variety  of ways of 
doing reduced-form  estimation  in a hypothetical  economy  that resembles 
the United  States  in 1954-66,  except  that  it has fiscal  and  monetary  reaction 
functions  that we have invented.  These experiments  can be viewed as 
"realistic"  illustrations  of the pitfalls  that we discuss  in the next section. 
Our basic conclusion  is that reduced-form  estimation  is at best a highly 
inefficient  and at worst a severely  biased method of estimating  policy 
multipliers. 
2. We examine  some possible  sources  of such correlation  in the next section. For the 
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But even the more conventional  structural  estimation  procedures  can 
run  into trouble  when  policy  is endogenous.  Two distinct  but related  prob- 
lems arise  here.  Consider  what  would  be done by an economist  seeking  to 
estimate  a structural  econometric  model  to assess  multipliers,  who omitted 
from his specification  equations  explaining  monetary  and fiscal policy. 
Assuming  that the authorities  were  in fact reacting  endogenously  during 
the period  in question,  he would  commit  two sorts  of errors  in treating  the 
policy  tools as exogenous.  First,  if using  two-stage  least squares,  he would 
presumably  utilize  all the policy variables  as instrumental  variables  in the 
first stage. Second,  where  structural  equations  include  some policy tools 
directly,  he would incorrectly  treat the endogenous  policy variable  as 
exogenous.  In both cases,  misclassification  of one or more  variables  would 
lead to inconsistent  estimates. 
The possible  simultaneous-equations  biases  that arise  from  ignoring  re- 
action functions  in estimating  structural econometric  models are treated 
below. They turn out to be the least serious  of the problems  caused  by 
reaction  functions,  at least in our Monte Carlo  experiments.  The reasons 
are simple, and probably  apply to a wide class of econometric  models. 
First, in most practical  applications  the list of predetermined  variables  is 
quite  long, so incorrectly  appending  some endogenous  policy  variables  to 
it may change the two-stage  least squares  estimates  very little. Second, 
policy variables  appear  explicitly  in very  few structural  relations,  so their 
misclassification  as exogenous  may have serious  effects  on only a handful 
of equations  in a very  large  model.  In fact,  in the simple  model  used  in our 
simulation  experiments,  even the one equation  that was seriously  affected 
by the misclassification  in principle proved  not to be seriously  affected  in 
practice. Furthermore,  as will be explained  in the next section,  there  may 
be plausible  reaction  patterns  that do not imply  estimation  biases,  even in 
theory. 
PROBLEMS  IN  USING  ECONOMETRIC  MODELS 
Once we have estimated  our model, and seek to utilize it to compute 
policy multipliers,  reaction  functions  lead to further  complexities.  And 
while  estimation  problems  are  common  to all users,  unified  policy  makers, 
uncoordinated  policy  makers,  and outside  economists  may all want  to use 
a given  model in different  ways. 
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estimation  biases  are negligible,  so that the estimates  of a and b  in equa- 
tion (1), obtained  under  the false assumption  that G and I are exogenous, 
are nevertheless  approximately  correct.  Assume further  that, during  the 
period  in question,  the policy makers  followed  reaction  functions  of the 
following  general  type: 
(4)  Gt =  G* -  g(t  Yt-*)  +  vt 
(5)  It =  I*-m(Y  -Y*)  +  et, 
where  G*,  I*, and Y*  are  the target  values  of the variables,  g and  m are  re- 
action coefficients,  and v and e are additive  disturbances.  What these be- 
havioral  rules  say is that  each  authority  has some  long-run  desired  path  for 
its policy  instrument,  but is willing  to deviate  from  it in response  to devia- 
tions of national  income from its target  level. Equations  (4) and (5) are 
specific  examples  of how the policy instruments  (Gt and It) can become 
negatively  correlated  with  the disturbance  term  of the partial  reduced  form. 
A model builder  who ignored  the reaction  functions  would presumably 
use his estimated  b to compute  policy  multipliers: 
dY  1  dY _  1 
(6)  dG  1-bb  dI  1-b' 
as in the partial  reduced  form. But, if the reaction  functions  were con- 
sidered  part of the model,  he would  presumably  solve the system  of equa- 
tions (1), (2), (4), (5) simultaneously  to find the true reduced-form  equa- 
tion for national  income: 
7  ~  ~~~  +  _a  G* +lI* +(g +m)  Yt*+  ut+  vt  +et  (7)  t 
From this expression,  it appears  natural  to compute  multipliers  such as 
(8)  dY  I  dY  _  1 
(8)  dG* -  1-b+g+m'  dI* 
-  1-b+g+m 
These  formulas  show, of course,  the usual  effects  of automatic  stabilizers. 
The  differences  between  (6) and  (8) are  precisely  analogous  to the difference 
between  the simple  Keynesian  multiplier  in the absence  of an income  tax, 
1/(1  -  b), and that same multiplier  in the presence  of an income tax at 
marginal rate t, 1/[1  -  b(-t)]. 
The  issue  of which  sort of multipliers  are  relevant  for which  sort of ques- 
tions  can  be clarified  with  the aid of Figure  1 below,  which  uses  government 
spending  multipliers  for illustrative  purposes.  Figure la depicts  the situa- Stephen  M. Goldfeld  and  Alan  S. Blinder  591 
Figure  1. Alternative  Notions  of Fiscal  Multipliers 
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tion in a world  with  no reaction  functions.  Because  the volume  of govern- 
ment  purchases  is independent  of GNP, no ambiguity  attaches  to the term 
"government  spending  multiplier."  If autonomous  government  spending 
shifts  upward  from  Go  to G1,  the fiscal  policy  multiplier  is simply  dY/dG  as 
in equation  (6). 
However,  when reaction  functions  exist, a "shift  in fiscal policy" has 
several  plausible  meanings.  Two of these  are  illustrated  in Figure  lb. There 
schedule  Go  depicts  the initial  reaction  function;  government  spending  is a 
declining  function  of output,  as in equation  (4). One  possible  interpretation 
of fiscal  expansion-the one adopted  in equation  (8) and elsewhere  in this 
study-is  an upward  shift  in the reaction  function  from  Go  to G'1  in Figure 
lb, that  is, an increase  in the intercept,  G*.  This  leads  us to compute  multi- 
pliers  like dY/dG*.  The analogy  to the standard  treatment  of tax multi- 
pliers  should  be obvious.  In models  that include  a tax function  like T = 
To +  tY, it  has become a  commonplace  to  compute multipliers  like 
dY/dTo  instead  of the ill-defined  dY/dT. Our use of dY/dG* instead  of 592  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
dY/dG  when  G is dependent  on Y is meant  to conform  to this practice.  It 
serves  to answer  the following  counterfactual  question:  What  would  have 
been the impact  on GNP if the allocation  branch  of the government  de- 
cided  to increase  government  spending  by $1 billion,  and the stabilization 
branch  adopted  a "business  as usual"  attitude? 
However,  under a second interpretation  of fiscal stimulus,  multipliers 
like dY/dG  are  more  interesting.  They  would  be relevant  if the authorities 
ordered  an  increase  in government  purchases  and  simultaneously  suspended 
the reaction  functions,  that is, shifted  from schedule  Go  to schedule  G' in 
Figure  lb (where  Yo  -  Y*  is the current  GNP gap).  On this interpretation 
of fiscal  actions,  whereby  the government  increases  spending  by dG =  dG* 
and then closes down the stabilization  branch,  multiplier  equations  such 
as (6) would  prevail.  And this may be the more  plausible  behavior  pattern 
in many cases. After all, our previous  characterization  of fiscal  policy (a 
switch  from Go  to G1  in Figure  lb) implies  that the government  first  raises 
expenditures  in order  to stimulate  income,  and  then  reduces  them  if income 
actually  rises. 
Which  interpretation  of fiscal  policy  actions  is the "correct"  one depends 
on who is doing  the multiplier  calculation.  From  the viewpoint  of a single 
policy-making  authority  charged  with stabilizing  national  income,  multi- 
pliers such as (6) would probably  matter  most; that is, it would be in- 
terested  only in the conventional  structural  equations  of a model, not in 
the reaction  functions,  since  it is not bound  by its own previous  behavior. 
A unified  stabilization  authority  need care about  historical  reaction  func- 
tions only to the extent  that structural  estimates  of the rest of the model 
might  be biased  if they are ignored;  and these  structural  estimation  biases 
may not be too important  in practice. 
Alternatively,  two stabilization  authorities  cooperating  perfectly  might 
not choose  to suspend  their  reaction  functions  but instead  might  maintain 
their  basic  reaction  patterns,  as in (4) and  (5), changing  only  the intercepts. 
This would  make multipliers  like (8) operational,  but both sets of policy 
makers  would  know  the reaction  coefficients,  g and  m, and  would  not have 
to worry  about  estimating  them  econometrically.  In such  a regime  the Fed 
does  not simply  inform  the administration  of the  monetary  policy  it intends 
to implement  if things  turn  out as they  now expect,  but actually  reveals  its 
course  under  every  conceivable  contingency,  that is, gives  it equation  (5). 
Symmetrically,  the administration  reveals  equation  (4) to the Fed, and  they 
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However,  we do not believe  that the U.S. institutional  framework  fits 
this paradigm.  Although  the fiscal and monetary  authorities  undeniably 
maintain  close contacts and attempt  to coordinate  their actions, recent 
U.S. economic  history  provides  instances  when they acted at cross pur- 
poses.  When  there  are  two more or less independent  stabilization  authori- 
ties,  reaction  functions  become  vitally  important  even  to the policy  makers. 
If, for example,  the Fed fails  to take  cognizance  of the fiscal  reaction  func- 
tion,  it will  hold an  inflated  view  of the  potency  of monetary  policy.  In terms 
of the contrasting  multipliers  in (6) and  (8), the Fed in this sort of a world 
should  build  the fiscal  reaction  function  into its multiplier: 
(8')  dY  1 
dI  1 -b  +g 
The estimate  of g might  come from  the administration  or from the Fed's 
own best guess  based  on econometric  or other  evidence. 
Policy  multipliers  are also of interest  to outside  economists  studying  the 
past use and effectiveness  of stabilization  policies.  Obviously,  if the data 
they  work  with  were  generated  in a regime  that  included  reaction  functions 
like  (4) and  (5), they  would  want  to compute  multipliers  like  (8) rather  than 
(6). 
In a word,  the purpose  of multiplier  calculations  dictates  the kind  to be 
made. Since  multipliers  such as (8) may be relevant,  the question  centers 
on the analytical  harm  done by computing  other  multipliers,  like (6). Be- 
cause  the answer  depends  on the nature  of both the model  and  the reaction 
functions,  we use  Monte  Carlo  techniques  in a simple  econometric  model  of 
the United  States  to investigate  the issue  and  find  that,  for sensible-looking 
reaction  functions,  the differences  in the multipliers  might be very large 
indeed. 
Thus,  for the outside  economist,  the only "right"  way to estimate  policy 
multipliers  econometrically  is to include  in his model  reaction  functions  for 
the fiscal  authorities  and for the Federal  Reserve  System.3  Otherwise,  the 
3. These observations  are hardly  original  with us. See, for example,  the comments  by 
Rudolf R. Rhomberg  and by H. T. Shapiro  in Journal  of Money, Credit  and Banking, 
Vol. 3 (May 1971), pp. 546-49 and 550-54, respectively.  The same points are stressed, 
and some of the results  of the next  section  are anticipated,  by Alan S. Blinder  and Robert 
M. Solow in their  forthcoming  survey  of fiscal  policy. In fact, the notion that endogenous 
policy responses  could vitiate the usefulness  of reduced-form  studies is as old as the 
oldest such study.  See John Kareken  and Robert M. Solow, "Lags  in Monetary  Policy," 
in E. Cary Brown and others, Stabilization  Policies, Prepared  for the Commission  on 
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models  may  continue  to overstate  multipliers,  in the sense  of (8), whatever 
the improvements  in specification  or estimation  techniques.  To date, few 
economists  have shown any inclination  to travel  this road. We conclude 
this study by briefly  outlining  some of the pitfalls  in estimating  reaction 
functions, and summarizing  most of the small literature  on empirical 
reaction  functions. 
Problems  in Estimating  Reduced-form  Equations 
Andersen  and  Jordan  revived  the  challenge  originally  posed  by Friedman 
and Meiselman,4  and advanced  a widely  discussed  "new"  method  of esti 
mating  policy  multipliers.  Instead  of devising  a complex  structural  model, 
which is bound to err in some respects,  why not estimate  the reduced 
form of the model directly,  that is, derive the multipliers  by regressing 
income on certain  "obvious"  exogenous  variables.  The Andersen-Jordan 
list of exogenous  variables  contains  only one fiscal  policy  variable  (or pos- 
sibly  two) and a monetary  policy  variable.  But even if the specification  al- 
lowed for many exogenous variables,  the resulting  multiplier  estimates 
might,  in our view, be difficult  to interpret.  The model  builder  might  well 
discern the "true"  policy instrument,  which the stabilization  authority 
"really"  controls,  and  yet may  be using  a variable  that  is endogenous  rather 
than exogenous.  Even if the partial  reduced-form  specification, 
(9)  Yt = k +  aFt  +  Mt  +  ct 
(where Y is an income aggregate,  F is a fiscal  variable,  M is a monetary 
variable,  and e is a disturbance  term),  includes  all the relevant  exogenous 
variables  and specifies  them  impeccably,5  it may still be untrue  that 
E(Me) =  E(Fe) =  0, 
where  E represents  the expected  value  operator.  In this case,  ordinary  least 
scquares  estimation  of (9) may give strange  results. 
4.  Milton Friedman and David Meiselman, "The Relative Stability of Monetary 
Velocity  and the Investment  Multiplier  in the United States, 1897-1958,"  in Stabilization 
Policies, pp. 165-268. 
5. This should not be interpreted  as minimizing  the difficulties  involved in proper 
specification  of the reduced  form. An extensive  literature  has focused  on such problems, 
and we have nothing to add to it. On the effects  of omitting  relevant  variables,  see Ed- 
ward M. Gramlich,  "The Usefulness of Monetary  and Fiscal Policy as Discretionary 
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SOME FORMAL  STABILIZATION  RULES 
On  the other  hand,  in some  cases  where  policy  does  respond  to economic 
events,  ordinary  least squares  estimation  of (9) will be valid because  e is 
uncorrelated  with F and M. 
A variety  of so-called  "optimal"  stabilization  policies  fall into this cate- 
gory, including, perhaps most importantly,  the  one-period certainty- 
equivalence  strategy  of Theil.6  For example,  suppose  the partial  reduced 
form is 
(10)  Yt =  aPt +  bZt + ut, 
where 
Yt=  the target variable 
Pt =  the policy instrument 
Zt  =  an exogenous  variable  whose future  values are not known with 
certainty 
u=  a random  disturbance  uncorrelated  with  Zt, 
and  a and  b are  known  and  fixed.  The optimal  stabilization  policy,  accord- 
ing to the certainty-equivalence  rule, is simply to proceed as if Zt  will take 
on the value E(Zt), and ut will take on the value E(ut) =  0 with certainty; 
that is, the policy  reaction  function  would  be 
(11)  Pt =  Yt -bE(Zt) 
a 
where  Y*  is the target  value  of Y.  P, will then  be uncorrelated  with ut.  We 
shall call equation  (11) a Theil reaction  function.  Now suppose  that an 
506-32; Levis  A. Kochin, "Judging  Stabilization  Policies"  (paper  presented  at the winter 
meeting of the Econometric  Society, Toronto, December 1972; processed).  On the ef- 
fects of misspecifying  the policy instruments,  see Gramlich,  "Usefulness  of Monetary 
and Fiscal  Policy,"  and  E. Gerald  Corrigan,  "The  Measurement  and  Importance  of Fiscal 
Policy Changes,"  Federal  Reserve  Bank of New York  Monthly  Review,  Vol. 52 (June 
1970), pp. 133-45. The paper by Gramlich, in particular,  suggests that an improved 
reduced-form  specification  can yield multiplier  estimates  that are much closer to those 
derived  from  large-scale  econometric  models.  The only study  known  to us that considers 
the possible  biases  caused  by endogenous  stabilization  policy  is Roger  N. Waud,  "Mone- 
tary  Control,  Monetary  Indicators,  and Reverse  Causation:  An Empirical  Investigation" 
(paper  presented  at the winter  meeting  of the Econometric  Society, Toronto, December 
1972; processed). 
6. Henri  Theil,  Economic  Forecasts  and  Policy (2nd ed., Amsterdam:  North-Holland, 
1961), or Optimal  Decision Rules  for Government  and Industry  (Rand McNally, 1964). 596  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
outside  economist  who does not know a and b proceeds  to estimate  (10). 
From the exogeneity  of P, we have the following: 
Proposition  1: A stabilization  policy  that follows  a Theil  reaction 
function  poses  no problems  for reduced-form  (or, for that matter, 
structural)  estimation. 
The recent  analysis  of optimal  monetary  policy  by Poole, for example,  ex- 
plores  several  Theil-type  reaction  functions.  If the Fed had adhered  strictly 
to one or the other  of these  rules,  it would  be perfectly  valid  to treat  their 
control  variable  (be it unborrowed  reserves,  the monetary  base,  the money 
stock, or the Treasury  bill rate)  as exogenous  for econometric  purposes.7 
Several  years ago, Brainard  proposed  a significant  amendment  to the 
Theil analysis  of optimal  stabilization  policy. He noted that while uncer- 
tainty  about  Zt,  Ut, and even  b ought  not to affect  the conduct  of stabiliza- 
tion policy,  uncertainty  about  a, the policy multiplier,  should.8  The reason 
is that  the uncertainty  over Y,  will  depend  (among  other  things)  on the level 
at which  Pt is set. In terms  of equation  (10), the Brainard  reaction  function 
would  be 
(12)  p  7i[ Y*  ~- E(bZ)]  -  P  O_aOGbZ+u 
(12)  a  +  Ca 
where 
a  =  the expected  value of a 
2-  the variance  of -a 
OfbZ+u =  the standard  deviation  of the composite  variable  (bZ +  u) 
p = the simple  correlation  between  a and (bZ +  u). 
It follows  that multiplier  uncertainty  in no way alters  the conclusion  that 
E(Ptut)  = 0. While  the optimal  setting  of stabilization  policy depends  on 
the variance  of u and  on its covariances  with  a and  b, it is independent  of the 
realized  value  of ut. Therefore, 
7. William Poole, "Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments  in a Simple 
Stochastic Macro Model," Quarterly  Journal  of Economics,  Vol. 84 (May 1970), pp. 
197-216. Poole also considers  a combination  policy in which the control variable,  the 
money stock, is made a function of current-period  interest  rates. As he notes, this leads 
to the type of simultaneity  difficulties  we treat below. 
8. William  C. Brainard,  "Uncertainty  and the Effectiveness  of Policy," in American 
Economic  Association,  Papers  andProceedings  of the  Seventy-ninth  Annual  Meeting,  1966 
(American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 57, May 1967),  pp. 411-25. The case considered  here 
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Proposition 2:  A stabilization policy that follows a Brainard re- 
action  function  poses no problems  for reduced-form  (or, for that 
matter,  structural)  estimation.  This  is true  even  if the disturbance 
term  is correlated  with the multipliers. 
In recent  years,  Theil's  framework  has been extended  into an explicitly 
dynamic,  intertemporal  context.9 These studies use the techniques of 
dynamic  programming  or control  theory  to derive  optimal  rules-or reac- 
tion functions-for the conduct of stabilization  policy. These reaction 
functions  are  essentially  linear  feedback  rules  whereby  this period's  setting 
of the policy instruments  depends  on the current  targets  and exogenous 
variables,  but only on lagged  values  of the endogenous  variables.  Thus  they 
imply  no contemporaneous  correlation  between  the policy  instruments  and 
the error  terms. 
Proposition  3: A stabilization  policy  that follows  any of a variety 
of linear  feedback  rules  of the kind that can be derived  from dy- 
namic  utility  maximization  poses no problems  for reduced-form 
(or, for that matter,  structural)  estimation. 
SOME INTUITIVE  STABILIZATION  RULES 
Of course,  real-world  policy  makers  do not follow any such  formal  rule. 
Sometimes  they perform  much worse than the rules would indicate-as 
when partisan  politics  throws  the fiscal  authorities  off course.  But some- 
times  they can outperform  the allegedly  "optimal"  rules. 
One  reason  this may  be possible  is that the decision  period  for stabiliza- 
tion policy-especially  for monetary  policy-is  often  shorter  than  the quar- 
terly data period upon which econometric  models are usually  based. In 
formal  models,  each  policy  instrument  is, in effect,  held constant  through- 
out each quarter;  but, in practice,  an authority  need not be bound  for an 
entire  quarter  by any initial  decision.  Data are  constantly  arriving,  for ex- 
ample,  at the Federal  Reserve  Board  that  may  suggest  the need  for revision 
in the initial  forecasts  made  by the Fed's  economists  and  hence  for prompt 
adjustment  in policy instruments.  In the present  context,  the continuous 
process  of receiving  new  information  and  revising  the settings  of the stabi- 
9. See, for example,  Gregory  C. Chow, "How Much Could be Gained by Optimal 
Stochastic Control Policies?" Annals of Economic and Social Measurement,  Vol.  1 
(October  1972), pp. 391-406. 598  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
lization  tools can  be viewed  as imparting  some  contemporaneous  correlation 
between  the policy variables  and the disturbance  terms;  that is to say, in 
actual  practice  it may be possible  to gear  policy to offset  the disturbance 
term,  and thus to outperform  any formal  lagged  feedback  rule.  Thus, if a 
policy maker  followed an optimal stabilization  rule, this month's  policy 
(say)  might  remain  independent  of this  month's  error  term,  but  this  quarter's 
policy could become  correlated  with this quarter's  error. 
In the context  of a simple  income  determination  model  such  as (9), these 
notions could be represented  by reaction  functions  in which  the current 
values  of the stabilization  tools are  functions  of some current  endogenous 
variables,  as in equations  (4) and (5) above.  Such  a model  could  consist  of 
(9)  Yt = k + aFt  +  fMt  +  Et 
(4')  Ft = F* -f(Yt  -  Yt  )  +  Vt 
(5')  Mt =  M*-m(Yt  -  Y*)  +  et. 
The true  reduced  form of this model  implies  a linear  relationship  between 
each policy variable  and the current  disturbance  term,  et. Specifically,  the 
reduced-form  equations  for Ft and Mt are 
13  T Fe  =-fK  Qlt +  h  fa  V,  -oet-h  fet 
(13)  v-e-j  (  )  M  ~  ~m!K  mae  h-  m:  m 
Mt  h+  Q2t 
- 
h  Vt +  e  e-  -h 
where 
h = 1 +fa  +  m: 
Qlt =  h  Ft  -  Mt+  h Y 
-ma F* +h  - m,B  *  m  * 
Qt=  h  h  h  t 
Alternatively,  if the authorities  react to movements  of the endogenous 
variables  only with a lag, but the error  in the partial  reduced  form (et) is 
autocorrelated,  the econometric  effects  would be the same: a linear  rela- 
tionship  between  Ft (or Mt) and c, 
To simplify  the computations,  we shall ignore the constant  terms in 
equations  like (13) and characterize  a wide variety  of such reaction  func- 
tions by directly  assuming  that both fiscal and monetary  policies are a 
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dom noise. For every result in this section, an analogous  but far more 
cumbersome  result can be derived  from reaction  functions  like (4') and 
(5'). 
In order  to attach some meaning  to the various  parameters,  we shall 
speak  as if the monetary  and fiscal authorities  attempted  to forecast  the 
disturbance  term-however imperfectly-and manipulated  their policy 
tools so as to offset  it. But this simple  paradigm  should  not be interpreted 
literally;  instead,  it stands  for any circumstance  in which  the behavior  of 
two uncoordinated  policy  makers'0  results  in a linear  relationship  between 
e and the policy instruments. 
Our  simple  story  thus  initially  consists  of the partial  reduced-form  equa- 
tion (9)11 plus these stylized reaction functions: 
(14)  F =--;  M =  , 
where  fF and  (M  are,  respectively,  the forecasts  of e made  by the fiscal  and 
monetary  authorities.  We assume  further  that 
(15)  EF =  E+  UF  EM  =  e+  UM, 
where  the forecast  errors,  UF and  UM, are independent  Of  C12 but may well 
be correlated  with  each other;  we call this correlation  between  the forecast 
errors  p. Finally,  we designate  the variance  of UF as 'y2o0  , where  a', is the 
variance  of E,  and the variance  of UM as 82-2 . The parameter  p indicates  the 
extent  to which  the two authorities  utilize  similar  forecasts.  The parameters 
y2 and  82 indicate  the astuteness  of each authority  in forecasting,  showing 
the size of the variance  of its forecast  error  relative  to the variance  of e. 
A low y  indicates  that  the government's  forecasts  have  a high  degree  of pre- 
cision and a low 8 indicates  the same  thing for the Fed. 
10. We assume  initially that each ignores  the other. This is somewhat  reminiscent  of 
a pair of Cournot  duopolists.  We later take up some possible  interrelations  of monetary 
and fiscal policy. 
11. We assume  that (9) does not omit any relevant  variables.  For a related  analysis 
based on the existence  of bias arising  from omitted  variables,  in addition  to the kinds of 
reaction-function  bias we shall discuss, see Kochin, "Judging Stabilization Policies." 
Furthermore,  in what follows, we are implicitly  thinking  of a world where Yt is the 
change  in GNP, k is the (constant) desired  change, and Ft and Mt are the changes  in 
fiscal and monetary policies. Thus in the absence of any policy moves, Yt would be 
k +  t. 
12. William  Poole has pointed  out to us that this may not be a desirable  property  for 
forecasts  to have. In the appendix,  we show how the analysis  would have to be altered  if 
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What  would  happen,  under  such  a regime,  if (9) were  estimated  by ordi- 
nary least squares?'3  Using (14), (15), and the standard  formulas  for the 
estimated  regression  coefficients  in (9), it is shown  in the appendix  that 
R  1  +  '5(PY  -  5) 
A 
(16)  =  Y(P  A  Y) 
where 
A=:  y2  +  82  2py8  +  y282(l  p2)  >  0- 
and where  the symbol  Ra  denotes  the ratio of the estimate  of a to the true 
value of a, with corresponding  notation  for j.14 
It is impossible  for both biases  to be positive  simultaneously.  For ae  is 
biased  upward  if and only if py > 8. But with p positive  (and, if it is not, 
neither  bias  is positive),  this implies  p2y  >  p8. But since  p2  <  1, this estab- 
lishes  that ,  is biased  toward  zero. 
The simplest  case, and one that graphically  highlights  the basic princi- 
ples, occurs  when  the forecast  errors  are  uncorrelated  (p = 0). In this case 
the percentage  biases become _-2/A  for the fiscal policy multiplier  and 
-y2/A  for the monetary  policy multiplier.  That is, both  policy multipliers 
are biased toward  zero, and the  policy maker who does the better  forecasting 
job gets the more serious bias. Thus one way of interpreting  the Andersen- 
Jordan  results  is as a suggestion  that  the fiscal  authority  is a superior  fore- 
caster  and the Fed is an inferior  one.15 
If the correlation  between  the forecasting  errors  is negative,  precisely  the 
same  conclusions  emerge  from  (16).  Both  biases  will  be negative,  and  a will 
be the more  seriously  biased  coefficient  if and  only  if 52  >  y2.  In plain En- 
13. Throughout  this section we shall refer  to the parameters  o and fi in (9) as "multi- 
pliers."  The previous  discussion  makes  clear  that they are  multipliers  that ignore  reaction 
functions (like (6) above) rather  than multipliers  that take reaction  functions into ac- 
count (like (8) above). 
14. The wording  in the text is heuristic  rather  than rigorous.  The actual definition 
of R', as is made clear in the appendix,  is 
R  = plim  /a, 
where  a  is the least squares  estimator  of ca  and  plim stands  for probability  limit. Hence, 
what we refer  to in the text as bias really  is asymptotic  bias. Equations  (16) are actually 
special cases of much more general  formulas  that are worked out in the appendix. 
15. We are not inclined  to draw  this conclusion.  As will be clear shortly,  the Ander- 
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glish,  the bias  will be more  serious  for the fiscal  multiplier  if and only if the 
Fed is the worse  forecaster. 
In fact, these  same  conclusions  hold even if p is positive,  provided  only 
that p'y  -  < 0 and p5 -  y <  0. Combining  these two inequalities  gives 
the crucial  condition: 
(17)  1>  >. 
If this is satisfied,  the basic result  that both multipliers  are biased  toward 
zero,  with  the "smarter"  authority  biased  more,  holds  even  if the  correlation 
is positive.  If p is relatively  small,  (17)  is almost  certain  to hold unless  a and 
y are  very disparate.  Similarly,  if 3 -'  y, (17) is bound  to hold even if p is 
rather  large. 
Thus, upward  bias can emerge  in one of the multipliers  only if one au- 
thority  is very much more astute  than the other  while the forecast  errors 
have  a substantial  positive  correlation.  If the Fed is cleverer,  so that  5/'y  is a 
very  small  number,  upward  bias  may appear  in the fiscal  policy  multiplier. 
Conversely,  an excellent  forecasting  record  on the part of the Council  of 
Economic  Advisers  might  lead to an overestimate  of the monetary  policy 
multiplier.  These  conclusions  are  summarized  in Table 1. 
Two extreme  cases  of bias  are  of interest  since  ordinary  least  squares  esti- 
mation of (9) performed  by the St. Louis Fed assigns  a coefficient  of ap- 
Table 1.  Biases in Multipliers for Fiscal Policy (a) and 
Monetary Policy (p) 
Relative  quality  of forecasters 
Fiscal  Monetary 
Relation  of  authority  authority 
forecast errors  much  better  Equally  good  much  better 
ax biased down  ax biased down  ax biased up 
Positively  correlated  ,  biased up  ,s biased down  13  biased down 
ax biased more  %  biases equal  j3 biased more 
a biased down  ax biased down  ax biased down 
Uncorrelated  ,s biased down  ,s biased down  ,B  biased down 
ax biased more  %  biases equal  i3  biased more 
a biased down  <x biased down  ax biased down 
Negatively correlated  (3  biased down  ,s biased down  ,s biased down 
a biased more  %  biases equal  ,B  biased more 
Source: Developed from equations (9) and (14)-(17) discussed in text. The results cited for the case of 
positively correlated forecast errors assume equation (17) holds. 602  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1972 
proximately  zero to fiscal  policy. Suppose  first  that one of the authorities 
possessed  a crystal  ball, so that  either  y or 8 was  zero.  In that  case,  as equa- 
tions (16) demonstrate,  the all-knowing  authority  would receive  an esti- 
mated  coefficient  of exactly  zero  while  the estimated  coefficient  of the other 
authority  would  be precisely  the true  multiplier.  Alternatively,  if one of the 
authorities  were  worthless  as  a forecaster,  the  multiplier  of the  bad  forecaster 
would  be unbiased  while  the other  multiplier  would  be biased  toward  zero. 
Under some conditions,  an estimated  multiplier  can even have the in- 
correct  sign.  The  condition  for  the  sign  of the  fiscal  multiplier  to be incorrect 
is that Ra  < 0, which  by (16) reduces  to: 
728 2(1  -  p2)  <  7(p  -  7) 
or 
7282(1 
-  p2)  a 
which  would  hold if the money  multiplier  had a large  enough  upward  bias 
and p were  sufficiently  high. 
In fact, this analysis  can go somewhat  further.  The standard  errors  of 
each estimated  coefficient  in (9) are worked  out in the appendix.  From 
these  results  and  equation  (16),  it is possible  to compute-for any  triplet  of 
y, 8, and p values-both the expected  coefficient  estimates  (as fractions  of 
the true  coefficients)  and  the expected  t-ratios  that would  be obtained  from 
ordinary  least squares  reduced-form  estimation  from an infinite  sample.'6 
Table 2 compiles  some selected  results,  and Figure  2 portrays  this same 
information  graphically. 
In this table,  rm  =  (1 +  2)-  iS our measure  of the forecasting  accuracy 
of the Federal  Reserve  (with rM  = 0 indicating  complete  inaccuracy,  and 
rM  = 1 indicating  perfect  accuracy),  and  rF is the like measure  for the fiscal 
authority.'7  Under  each  r value,  the  corresponding  y or  8 value  is also given. 
The entries  in the table are the values for Ra (with unity indicating  the 
absence  of bias) along with the expected  t-ratios  in parentheses.  Because 
(16) is symmetrical,  the tables  can be used  to read off RO  simply  by inter- 
changing  the roles of rM  and rF. 
For example, if p =  0, rM  =  0.1, and rF = 0.5, the fiscal multiplier, a, 
would  be biased  down  by about  25 percent  and  the t-ratio  in large  samples 
would  be about 1.74.  By contrast,  the monetary  multiplier,  A,  would  have 
16. Assuming  that (9) is the true model of the real world, which it certainly  is not! 
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Table 2.  Ratios of Estimated to Actual Fiscal Multipliers for Selected 
Levels of Correlation  between Forecast Errors and Various Degrees of 
Astuteness of Fiscal and Monetary Authoritiesa 
Forecast 
accuracy  Forecast  accuracy  of monetary  authority,  rM 
of fiscal 
authority,  0  0.1  0.5  0.95  1.0 
rp  (a=  a)  (5 =  9.95)  (6 =  1.73)  (5 =  0.33)  (5  0) 
a.  p=  0 
0  1  1  1  1  1 
0.1  0.990  0.990  0.992  0.999  1 
(  = 9.95)  (9.95)  (10.00)  (11.49)  (31.87)  (  ) 
0.5  0.750  0.752  0.800  0.969  1 
(  =  1.73)  (1.73)  (1.74)  (2.00)  (5.55)  (  ) 
0.95  0.097  0.098  0.126  0.526  1 
(  =  0.33)  (0.33)  (0.33)  (0.38)  (1.05)  (  ) 
1.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  (  ) 
(Y  =  )  ...)  (  )  ( ...)  (...)  (...) 
b.  p=  0.5 
o  1  1  1  1  1 
0.1  0.987  0.993  1.018  1.015  1 
(,y  9. 95)  (8.62)  (8.63)  (10.49)  (35.35)  G - 
0.5  0.692  0.706  0.846  1.063  1 
(y  1.73)  (1.50)  (1.46)  (1.59)  (5.70)  (... 
0.95  0.075  0.063  0.024  0.537  1 
(y  0. 33)  (0.29)  (0.23)  (0.07)  (0.64) 
1.0  0  0  0  0 
(Y  =  )  ...)  (  )  ( ...)  (...)  (z 
c.  p=  0.9 
0  1  1  1  1  1 
0.1  0.950  0.995  1.098  1.030  1 
(Y =  9.95)  (4.34)  (4.34)  (9.31)  (65.37)  (... 
0.5  0.363  0.345  0.870  1.189  1 
(=  1.73)  (0.76)  (0.59)  (0.77)  (9.76)  (... 
0.95  0.020  -0.008  -0.160  0.547  1 
(=  0.33)  (0.14)  (-0.06)  (-0.69)  (0.26)  (... 
1.0  0  0  0  0  0 
('Y =  )  (...)  (...)  ( ...)  (...)  (... 
Source: Derived from equations (16) discussed in the text and (A-6) in the appendix. The numbers in 
parentheses  are t-ratios. 
a. p =  correlation of forecast errors; y and 5 =  astuteness of fiscal and monetary authorities, respec- 
tively. The entries in the table are the values for the fiscal multiplier ratios Rc (see equations (16).  The cor- 
responding  values for the monetary multiplier ratios RP  are read by interchanging  the roles of rm and rp. For 
example, in reading Ra  from the a section of the table, when rm = 0.1 and rp =  0.5,  the value is  0.752; 
correspondingly, for RA,  when rm =  0.5 and rF =  0.1, the value is 0.992. 604  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1972 
Figure 2.  Ratios of Estimated to Actual Fiscal Multipliers for Selected 
Levels of Correlation  between Forecast Errors and Various Degrees of 
Astuteness of Fiscal and Monetary Authoritiesa 
Ra 
1.0  _  .  ,  ,.  . 
rF  0.  25  _  -- 
r=  0.50 
0.5  a. p-0.0 










0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1.0 
rM 
Source: Same as Table 2. 
a.  p = correlation of forecast errors; r,  and rm -  astuteness of fiscal and monetary authorities, respec- 
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only a negligible  downward  bias (less  than 1 percent)  and a t-ratio  of 11.5. 
With  the fiscal  authority  nearly  clairvoyant  and thus rF equal  to 0.95, the 
estimate  of a would  be only  about  one-tenth  of the true  ae  (with  a t-ratio  of 
0.33), while the estimate  of ,B  would be essentially  unbiased  (with an ex- 
pected  t-statistic  of about  32).  Indeed,  as Table  2 suggests,  the t-ratio  for  the 
money  multiplier  becomes  arbitrarily  large  as the forecasting  ability  of the 
fiscal  authority  improves,  and vice versa. 
Table  2 exhibits  several  examples  of estimated  coefficients  with  the wrong 
sign.  Although  these  tables  do not show  it, the incorrectly  signed  coefficient 
can even appear  statistically  significant  by the conventional  (but inappro- 
priate)  t-test. 
Though  many  other  interpretations  are  possible,  Table  2b offers  one case 
that is quite  consistent  with  the version  of the St. Louis  equation  reported 
by Andersen  and Carlson.  When  r. = 0.95 (that is, the fiscal  authority  is 
nearly  clairvoyant)  and rM= 0.5 (the monetary  authority  is a fair fore- 
caster),  this table says that the estimated  fiscal  multiplier  should  be only 
about  21/2  percent  of its true  value,  while  the monetary  multiplier  should  be 
overestimated  by about  6 percent.  The  Andersen-Carlson  findings  of a mul- 
tiplier  of about 51/2  for the money stock and 0.05 for government  pur- 
chases  could  arise  in such  a milieu  if the true  multipliers  were  about  51/4 for 
money  and  2 for government  spending,  not an implausible  pair  of values.'8 
Figure  2 corresponds  to Table  2. Each  panel  plots  the behavior  of R , the 
ratio  of the estimated  to the actual  fiscal  multiplier,  as the  forecasting  ability 
of the Fed (as measured  by rM)  improves.  In the first  panel,  where  the fore- 
casting errors are uncorrelated,  everything  is straightforward.  The bias 
is more serious  the better forecasters  the fiscal authorities  are, and less 
serious  the better  the monetary  authorities  are. The second  panel, where 
p = 0.5, tells almost  the same story,  but does show some instances  where 
condition  (17) is violated  so that the multiplier  estimate  is actually  biased 
upward  (Ra  >  1). It also points out the possibility  (for very  high rM)  that 
the fiscal  authorities  might  look better  (that is, have a higher  Ra) by fore- 
casting  better  (that  is, by raising  r, from  0.25  to 0.50).  As we already  know, 
18. See Leonall C. Andersen  and Keith M. Carlson,  "A Monetarist  Model for Eco- 
nomic Stabilization,"  Federal  Reserve  Bank of St. Louis Review,  Vol. 52 (April 1970), 
p. 11. The t-ratios  reported  by Andersen  and Carlson-8.1 for monetary  policy and 0.17 
for fiscal policy-are  also roughly  consistent  with the data in Table 2b. This is not the 
only (nor even the best) set of parameters  that would "explain"  their results. Other 
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such unconventional  results  occur  much more frequently  when p is very 
high.  The third  panel,  which  corresponds  to p = 0.9, depicts  a wide  variety 
of parameter  values  that result  in upward  bias (Ra  >  1), or a better  per- 
formance  by the fiscal  authority  the more accurately  it forecasts,  or both. 
This figure  also exhibits  instances  of estimated  multipliers  with the wrong 
sign. 
While  the general  tendency  seems  to be for downward  bias  in estimating 
the fiscal  multiplier  to become  more serious  as the administration's  fore- 
casts  improve  (rF rises),  as the Fed's forecasts  deteriorate  (rM  falls),  and as 
the correlation  between  the two forecasts  rises,  Figure  2 and  Table  2 reveal 
a bewildering  variety  of possibilities.  And, unfortunately,  very  few can be 
ruled  out until much more is known about the reaction  functions  of the 
authorities.  Without  such  knowledge,  it is impossible  to interpret  the  results 
of reduced-form  estimates. 
These  results  can be summarized  in the following  statement:'9 
Proposition  4: If the stabilization  authorities  are imperfectly  off- 
setting a stochastic  error  term,  reduced-form  estimates  of both 
policy multipliers  are likely to be biased toward  zero, with the 
larger  percentage  bias associated  with  the more  astute  forecaster. 
MULTIPLIER  ERRORS OR PARTIAL  ADJUSTMENT 
In the analysis  so far, the only thing that prevented  either  the Federal 
Reserve  or the administration  from doing a perfect  job of stabilizing  in- 
come (apart  from the actions of the other) was errors  in forecasting.  In 
practice,  things  are not quite  so tidy. Even when  the authorities'  forecasts 
hit the bull's  eye, they often do not take the appropriate  actions.  A variety 
of such  cases  can be handled  by the simple  device  of changing  the reaction 
functions  from (14) to: 
(18)  F _  ,  M-  _M 
a  17b'7 
where  a and b are equal  not to the multipliers  oa  and A,  but instead  to Woa 
and  w3. 
One interpretation  of this case is that the authorities  do not know the 
19. Biases in the real  world  are more complicated  than this. Our  bias formulas  are all 
predicated  on the existence  of a stable reaction  function. In practice,  reaction  patterns 
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true  multipliers,  but  think  that  they  are  a and  b. In this  case,  X  and  w are  the 
factors  by which  the fiscal  and monetary  authorities,  respectively,  misesti- 
mate their  own multipliers;  for example,  X =  1.2 means  that the adminis- 
tration  thinks  its multiplier  is 20 percent  higher  than it actually  is. As a 
result,  of course,  its actions  will be only 1/1.2, or 83.3  percent,  as strong  as 
they should  be. Alternatively,  the fiscal  authority  may know its multiplier 
accurately,  but choose to offset only 83.3 percent  of any random  distur- 
bance,  as a result  of cowardice,  bureaucratic  inertia,  innate  conservatism, 
or just plain pig-headedness.  Another  interpretation  is that an attempt  to 
close only a fraction  of the gap between  actual  and desired  GNP could  be 
an optimal  response  in the face of multiplier  uncertainty  of the kind ana- 
lyzed  by Brainard.20  Finally,  a partial  response  could  arise  because  the ad- 
ministration  realizes  that the Fed will also be trying  to offset part of the 
stochastic  disturbance,  and does not want the total stabilization  policy 
package  to be too strong.  Symmetrically,  a X  value  less than  unity  could  in- 
dicate  an underestimated  multiplier,  or the overzealous  reactions  of a panic- 
prone  fine  tuner,  or a belief  on the part  of the fiscal  authority  that the Fed 
would  act in a procyclical  manner.  A final  case,  which  may  be of interest  in 
view  of the historical  pattern  of U.S. stabilization  policy,  is where  X  or co,  or 
both,  is negative.  That  is, the  administration  or  the  Fed  follows  a procyclical 
course,  exacerbating  random  disturbances.21  All of these  possiblities  can  be 
handled  by utilizing  reaction  functions  (18) rather  than (14) to develop 
expressions  for the bias similar  to (16). It turns  out that 
RI  = I +  X_(P_  _  ) 
(19)  ~~~~~RO  =  I +  <O'(Pa 
- 
). 
Thus, incorrect  estimation  of multipliers  by the authorities  (alone or in 
combination  with too weak or too strong stabilization  actions)  requires 
only minor  modification  of the conclusions  summarized  in Table 1 above. 
In particular,  all of the previous  findings  about the signs of the biases  re- 
main valid when X or w are not unity, so long as they are positive.  The 
scalars  X  and  w  affect  only  the absolute  magnitudes  of the percentage  biases 
20. See equation  (12) above with p = 0. 
21. For example, whenever  the Fed has allowed bank reserves  to move in a pro- 
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-not  their direction;  but they can reverse  our previous  findings  about 
which  bias was the more serious.  Thus: 
Proposition  5: Overestimating  one's multiplier  or reacting  too 
weakly  to random  fluctuations  in macroeconomic  activity  will 
result  in a larger  (in absolute  value)  bias than would "correct" 
reactions.  Conversely,  underestimating  the multiplier  or reacting 
too vigorously  to random  shocks  will tend  to mitigate  the bias. 
If, however,  either  authority  should  behave  in a procyclical  manner,  its 
bias would  be reversed,  as is clear  from  (19). For example,  if both original 
biases  in (16) were  negative,  but if the Fed were  reacting  perversely  to ran- 
dom disturbances  (co  <  0), the  estimate  of the money  multiplier  would now 
be biased  upward. 
Proposition  6: If the stabilization  authorities  are behaving  in a 
procyclical manner, reduced-form  estimates of  policy multi- 
pliers  are likely to be biased  upward,  with the larger  bias asso- 
ciated  with  the authority  that  is (a) pursuing  the less  vigorous  pro- 
cyclical  policy, and (b) forecasting  more  accurately. 
Table 3 gives some sample  computations  of the expected  results  from 
ordinary  least squares  regressions  on (9) when X and w are not equal to 
unity.  As before,  the table  displays  the fiscal  multiplier  and must  be trans- 
posed to supply  the money multiplier.22  The range of possibilities  is, if 
anything,  even  more  staggering  than  before.  For example,  in Table  3c, for 
rM =  0.5, rF =0.95  there  now appears  a fiscal  multiplier  whose  magnitude 
is three-quarters  of the true  value  but is negative  and significant!  Table  3d 
underscores  the point of proposition  7 that, when the fiscal authority  is 
behaving  procyclically,  reduced-form  studies are likely to overestimate 
the fiscal  multiplier. 
As was the case with Table 2, a number  of these results  are consistent 
with the Andersen-Carlson  findings,  for example,  the entries  in Table 3c 
with rM  =  0.1 and rF =  0.5. Compared with the case above that matches 
the St. Louis results,  the forecasts  of the authorities  are of poorer  quality 
and closer to one another.  In addition,  both authorities  overstate  their 
multipliers  by 50 percent. 
22. In addition,  in the present  case the roles of X and w must be interchanged.  Note 
that equations  (19) imply that w is irrelevant  for the fiscal multiplier  and X  is irrelevant 
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Table 3.  Ratios of Estimated to Actual Fiscal Multipliers for Selected 
Levels of Correlation  between Forecast Errors and Multiplier 
Misestimation Factors and Various Degrees of Astuteness of 
Fiscal and Monetary Authoritiesa 
Forecast 
accuracy  Forecast accuracy of monetary  authority,  rM 
of fiscal 
authority,  0  0.1  0.5  0.95  1.0 
rF  (3=  '?)  (  =  9.95)  (3  =  1.73)  (3=  0.33)  (=  0) 
a.  p =  0.5, X =  0.5 
o  1  1  1  1  1 
(e  =  O)  (  G  -.)  O.) 
0.1  0.993  0.997  1.009  1.007  1 
(y  =  9.95)  (17.35)  (17.32)  (20.79)  (70.19) 
0.5  0.846  0.853  0.923  1.032  1 
(y  =  1.73)  (3.67)  (3.52)  (3.46)  (11.06) 
0.95  0.537  0.531  0.512  0.769  1 
(y  =  0.33)  (4.08)  (3.90)  (2.89)  (1.82) 
1.0  0.500  0.500  0.500  0.500  (.) 
(  0y  )  (..  )  (..  )  (..  )  (..  )(-. 
b.  p =  0.5, X =  1.5 
0  1  1  1  1  1 
(e  =  co  (  )  (  )  (  (-.)( 
0.1  0.980  0.990  1.027  1.022  1 
(y  = 9.95)  (5.71)  (5.74)  (7.06)  (23.74) 
0.5  0.538  0.559  0.769  1.095  1 
(Y =  1.73)  (0.78)  (0.77)  (0.96)  (3.91)  (  ) 
0.95  -0.388  -0.406  -0.464  0.306  1 
(y  =  0.33)  (-0.98)  (-0.99)  (-0.87)  (0.242)  (...) 
1.0  -0.500  -0.500  -0.500  -0.500  (***) 
(  0y  )  (..  )  (..  )  (..  )  ()( 
c.  p =  0.9, X =  1.5 
0  1  1  1  1  1 
(e  =...()  )  (..  )  (..  )  (- 
0.1  0.924  0.992  1.147  1.045  1 
(y  =  9.95)  (2.81)  (2.89)  (6.49)  (44.21) 
0.5  0.045  0.017  0.805  1.283  1 
(y  =  1.73)  (0.062)  (0.019)  (0.474)  (7.022)  (.) 
0.95  -0.470  -0.513  -0.740  0.320  1 
(y  =  0.33)  (-2.23)  (-2.28)  (-2.13)  (0.10)  (  ) 
1.0  -0.500  -0.500  -0.500  -0.500  (.) 
(  0y  )  (..  )  (..  )  (..  )  (..  )  - 
d.  p =  0.5, X =-0.5 
0  1  1  1  1  1 
(e  =  O)  (  )()()(O  @@ 
0.1  1.007  1.003  0.991  0.993  1 
(y  =  9.95)  (17.59)  (17.42)  (20.42)  (69.21) 
0.5  1.154  1.147  1.077  0.968  1 
(y  =  1.73)  (5.01)  (4.73)  (4.04)  (10.37) 
0.95  1.463  1.469  1.488  1.237  1 
(y  =  0.33)  (11.12)  (10.79)  (8.40)  (2.91)  (  ) 
1.0  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1 
(e  =O0)  (  )  (..  )  (..  )  (..  )  (...  ) 
Source: Derived from equation (19) discussed in text. The numbers in parentheses are t-ratios. 
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LAGGED  RESPONSES 
The analysis  can be taken  one step further  by allowing  for lags in reac- 
tion functions.  If the authorities  offset  the lagged  disturbance,  'e,  but do 
so with some error,  equations  (18) should  be replaced  by 
(20)  F  -(et-  +  UF)  M=-(et-  +  UM) 
a  b 
where,  as before,  a and b are the multipliers  perceived  by the authorities. 
Lags  in the reaction  function  eliminate  simultaneous-equations  bias if the 
disturbance  term  is independent  over  time,  but  not if it is serially  correlated. 
So, for the present  case, we assume  Et follows a simple  first-order  auto- 
regressive  scheme  given  by 
(21)  Et  =  P*  *t-1  +  et 
where  p* is the serial  correlation  coefficient. 
Following  the same steps used to derive  the earlier  results  (see the ap- 
pendix)  yields  the biases: 
Ra=  I +  Xp*(p  -  ) 
(22)  -  1  (  ) 
R-  I  A 
T*Pb- 
The similarity  between  equations  (22) and  (19) is striking.  Therefore: 
Proposition  7: As contrasted  with the standard  case, if the au- 
thorities  seek instead  to offset  a lagged  disturbance  that is auto- 
correlated,  the percentage  biases are those of the standard  case 
multiplied  by a fraction  p*, where p* is the serial correlation 
coefficient. 
So long as p*  is positive,  all the qualitative  results  obtained  for  the standard 
case  mainly  apply  here  as well.  For example,  Tables  2 and  3 can  be used  for 
the present  case simply  by interpreting  X as Xp*- that is, Table 3a could 
now be used for the case X =  1, p* =  0.5. 
POLICY  INTERACTIONS 
A third  extension  of the simple  reaction  functions  used  in equation  (14) 
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trying  to stabilize  macroeconomic  activity.  In the absence  of explicit  co- 
ordination,  each  might  forecast  the actions  of the other,  and adjust  its own 
policies  accordingly.  The two cases  are  precisely  symmetrical,  but for con- 
creteness  let us suppose  that the Fed takes  account  of the administration's 
behavior,  while the fiscal  authority  ignores  the central  bank. The model, 
then, consists  of 
(9)  Yt =  k +  aFt +  #Mt +  c- 
(23)  F _  (fF), 
M- 
(EM+A  F), 
(23)  ~~~~~a  b 
where 
a = Xax,  the administration's  estimate  of its own multiplier 
A = sa, the Fed's  estimate  of the fiscal  multiplier 
b = cf,  the Fed's  estimate  of its own multiplier 
F', (M  =  the  forecast  of the  disturbance  term  made  by the administration 
and the Fed, respectively 
F =  the Fed's forecast  of fiscal  policy. 
Expressions  for the biases  in this case  are  given  in the appendix.  The  neces- 
sary modification  for estimating  the money multiplier  turns out to be 
trivial: 
Proposition  8: If the monetary  authority  predicts  fiscal  policy  and 
modifies  its actions  accordingly,  the bias in estimating  the money 
multiplier  shrinks  in size, but has the same direction.  As the ac- 
curacy  of the Fed's predictions  of fiscal  policy  improves,  the bias 
in the money  multiplier  increases.  In the limit, when  it forecasts 
fiscal  behavior  perfectly,  the bias is just as large as if it did not 
forecast  it at all. 
What  happens  to the estimate  of the fiscal  policy  multiplier  is much  more 
complicated.  Proposition  9 summarizes  the results: 
Proposition  9: If the monetary  authority  predicts  fiscal  policy  and 
modifies  its actions  accordingly,  the bias in estimating  the fiscal 
multiplier becomes more negative than previously. It might even 
change  sign  from  positive  to negative.  Increases  in the  Fed's accu- 
racy  have an uncertain  effect  on this bias. 
These  last propositions  perhaps  supply  a more  reasonable  interpretation 
of the St. Louis Fed results.  Even if the fiscal  authority  were  the inferior 612  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
forecaster,  the fiscal  multiplier  might  still have the more serious  bias if (a) 
the administration  was  a more  cautious  stabilizer  than  the  Fed (see  proposi- 
tion 5); or (b) the central  bank tried  to predict  and take account  of fiscal 
policy while the fiscal authority  did not do likewise  for monetary  policy 
(see propositions  8 and 9). Even in the limiting  case where  fiscal  policy is 
truly  exogenous,  such actions  on the part  of the Fed would  lead to down- 
ward  bias in the estimated  fiscal  policy  multiplier. 
A MORE GENERAL  MODEL 
A final  extension  of the analysis  modifies  the  partial  reduced-form  model, 
equation  (9), rather  than the reaction  functions.  Clearly,  monetary  and 
fiscal policy are not the only exogenous  variables  that should enter any 
properly  specified  partial  reduced  form. Therefore  equations  like the St. 
Louis model are subject  to considerable  bias from omitted  variables.  Our 
analysis  has deliberately  abstracted  from  this kind of bias in order  to con- 
centrate  on the biases  caused  by endogenous  stabilization  policy. But the 
results  obtained  for an economy  satisfying  equation  (9) can be extended  to 
more  realistic  situations  with  exogenous  variables  other  than  monetary  and 
fiscal  policy.  In particular,  suppose  that the true  reduced-form  equation  is 
(9')  Y=k  + aF  +  OM +  ,uX  + e, 
where X is some exogenous  variable  uncorrelated  with e. This calls for 
some modification  in the reaction  functions.  Since  the level of Y would  be 
affected  by both X and e, the authorities  should  attempt  to predict  both, 
and to offset  their  joint effect.  That  is, 
F  (11XF + 
EF)  a 
(24) 
M -  (AXM  + 
EAI) 
where  tF  and IM are the forecasts  of X by the fiscal and monetary  au- 
thorities,  respectively. 
The  tedious  manipulations  needed  to analyze  this  case  are  summarized  in 
the appendix.  It turns  out that  none of our  basic  conclusions  is overturned. 
Proposition 10: If the stabilization  authorities  are  imperfectly  off- 
setting  both a stochastic  error  term and an exogenous  variable, 
reduced-form  estimates  of all parameters  are very likely to be 
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ciated  with the more astute  forecaster  (now defined  in terms  of 
both e and X) will have the larger  percentage  bias. 
As is usual  in econometric  analyses  of specification  error,  it is difficult  to 
prove that analogous  results  would hold in a completely  general  model 
with  an arbitrary  number  of policy  instruments  and  of exogenous  variables. 
Still,  this last case  is sufficiently  general  to encourage  speculation  that  they 
would.  Furthermore,  the preceding  models  of multiplier  errors,  partial  ad- 
justment,  lagged  responses  with serially  correlated  errors,  and interactions 
between  monetary  and fiscal  policy generally  point in the same  direction; 
that is, if the monetary  or fiscal  authorities  (or both) are consciously  pur- 
suing  a countercyclical  stabilization  policy,  partial  reduced-form  estimates 
of all multipliers  most  likely  will  be underestimates.  By contrast,  if policy  is 
procyclical,  partial  reduced-form  estimates  will  probably  be too high. 
In summary,  for a wide  class  of plausible  behavioral  patterns  on the part 
of the stabilization  authorities,  it may be fruitless  to assess  policy multi- 
pliers  by estimating  partial  reduced-form  equations.  If such  exercises  are  to 
be done at all, policy  instruments  should  at least  be treated  as endogenous 
variables,  and  appropriate  estimation  techniques  employed.  We  shall  return 
to this problem  below, when  we offer  some concrete  examples  of the sub- 
stantial  differences  between  endogenous  and  exogenous  treatment  of policy 
instruments  in estimating  reduced-form  equations. 
Estimating  Structural  Models:  Some  Simulation  Results 
Estimates  of policy multipliers  can, and in general  should, be derived 
from a structural  model rather  than from a reduced-form  method.  To do 
this, one must  first  specify  and  consistently  estimate  all the structural  equa- 
tions, and then compute  the solved  reduced  form. The next two sections 
deal  with  these  problems  in order. 
Instead  of continuing  the simple  analytical  approach  of the previous  sec- 
tion, we thought  it more  illuminating  to analyze  the structural  estimation 
problem  in the context of a small "realistic"  econometric  model of the 
United States. To do this, we have borrowed  the model developed  by 
Moroney  and Mason,23  which  has the following  structure: 
23. J. R. Moroney and J. M. Mason, "The Dynamic Impacts  of Autonomous  Ex- 
penditures  and the Monetary  Base on Aggregate  Income,"  Journal  of Money,  Credit  and 
Banking,  Vol. 3 (November  1971),  pp. 793-814. We chose this model because  it is essen- 
tially linear, which makes it possible  to calculate  explicitly  the reduced  form. 614  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
(25a)  Ct  ao +  a,  EY  +  a2 C,-l  +  a3M, +  a4Mt-1 +  ult 
(25b)  It = bo  +  bl(Ct,  -  Ct-2) +  b2  Y +  b3  RL,-2  +  b4I-l +  U2t 
(25c)  Ot  =  Co+  cl  Yt + u3t 
(25d)  RLt = do+d1RSt+d2Yt+  u4 
(25e)  M = (eo  +  el RS,,  +  e2RD,-i)B, +  u.5 
(25f)  RS = fo +fi  Yt  +f2Mt +  u6z 
(25g)  Yt  = Ct+It+Gt+Et-Ot 
where 
Y=  GNP 
C =  consumption expenditures 
I = gross  private  domestic  investment 
G =  government purchases 
E =  exports 
0  = imports 
M = money  stock (currency  plus demand  deposits) 
RS =  short-term interest rate 
RL = long-term interest rate 
B = unborrowed  reserves  plus currency 
RD =  discount rate 
u =  disturbance term, 
and all dollar  variables  are in current  prices. 
We gathered  data  for these  variables,  approximating  the original  defini- 
tions of the Moroney-Mason  model,  for the sample  period  1953:3-1965:4. 
We then estimated  their  model by two-stage  least squares,  correcting  for 
autocorrelation  in each equation.24  The estimated  parameters  and their 
standard  errors  appear  in Table  4 in the columns  labeled  "true  value"  and 
"true  standard  error."25 
24. The estimation technique is due to Ray C. Fair; see his "The Estimation of 
Simultaneous  Equation Models with Lagged Endogenous Variables  and First Order 
Serially  Correlated  Errors,"  Econometrica,  Vol. 38 (May 1970),  pp. 507-16. 
25. We should note that the reported  money supply equation  (25e) differs  from the 
original  specification,  which was linear in current  values of B, RS, and RD. We altered 
the specification  because we felt that it yielded an unreasonably  low estimate of the 
multiplier  for B or M (for example, Moroney and Mason report a multiplier  of 1.8, 
which implies an elasticity  of the money stock with respect  to the base of only about 
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Table  4. Results  of Alternative  Methods  of Structural  Estimation 
Mean estimate  Root mean-squared 
coefficients  error 
Policy  Policy  True  Policy  Policy 
True  treated  as  treated  as  standard  treated  as  treated  as 
value  exogenous  endogenous  error  exogenous endogenous 
Parameter"  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
ao  -32.85  -36.46  -37.92  14.55  9.79  8.70 
a,  0.131  0.188  0.182  0.045  0.106  0.077 
a2  0.751  0.659  0.664  0.059  0.082  0.066 
a3  0.479  0.455  0.508  0.272  0.079  0.093 
a4  -0.123  -0.070  -0.104  0.324  0.176  0.132 
bo  1.31  1.86  1.98  2.67  4.17  4.30 
bi  0.290  0.279  0.249  0.251  0.334  0.333 
b2  0.053  0.057  0.059  0.014  0.015  0.016 
b3  --3.11  -3.41  -3.45  0.911  0.630  0.661 
b4  0.768  0.752  0.737  0.099  0.114  0.119 
cO  -1.30  -0.96  -0.97  1.45  1.20  1.22 
Cl  0.048  0.048  0.048  0.003  0.002  0.002 
do  1.33  1.25  1.36  0.74  0.89  1.15 
di  0.684  0.681  0.683  0.089  0.033  0.50 
d2  0.0006  0.0007  0.0006  0.002  0.002  0.002 
eo  3.04  3.02  3.03  0.062  0.092  0.092 
ei  0.026  0.026  0.026  0.018  0.005  0.005 
e2  -0.056  -0.053  -0.054  0.027  0.025  0.025 
fo  1.60  13.61  14.15  11.63  13.50  14.14 
fi  0.061  0.048  0.049  0.015  0.015  0.014 
f2  -0.257  -0.250  -0.257  0.102  0.018  0.022 
Source: Estimated Moroney-Mason model from equations (25a)-(25i). See text for discussion, and J. R. 
Moroney and J. M. Mason, "The Dynamic Impacts of Autonomous Expenditures  and the Monetary Base on 
Aggregate Income," Joqrnal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 3 (November 1971), pp. 793-814, for a 
description of the model. Columns 1 and 4 are based on actual data for the sample period 1953:3-1965:4. 
The other columns are based on fifty-two-period simulations corresponding roughly to the U.S.  economy 
from 1954:1-1966:4. 
a.  The parameters  are for equations (25a)-(25f). 
Our  basic  method  was  to apply  Monte  Carlo  techniques  to a hypothetical 
economy  with structure  as described  by equations  (25), to see what  sort of 
estimation  biases  might  arise  if the stabilization  policy  instruments  (B and 
G)  were  (incorrectly)  treated  as exogenous.  To do this,  we had  to append  to 
the basic Moroney-Mason  model two policy reaction  functions: 
(25h)  Bt=Bt  +  ho +  hl(Yt -  Yt*) +  h2(RSt  -  RSt_) 
+ h3(Et -  0)  +  U7t 
(25i)  Gg  = G*  io +i(Yt-4)+  u8t, 616  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
where 
B* = desired  long-run  trend  value of the monetary  base 
G* = desired  long-run  trend  value  of government  expenditures 
Y* = potential  GNP.26 
The  following  section  considers  these  reaction  functions  in greater  detail. 
For present  purposes  it suffices  to note that  (25h)  asserts  that  the monetary 
authorities  were  concerned  with the GNP gap, interest  rate stability,  and 
the trade balance,  while (25i) implies that the fiscal authorities  reacted 
solely  to the gap. These  equations  were  not estimated;  rather  their  param- 
eters  were  fixed  a priori.27 
The entire  set of nine equations  (25a)-(25i)  was then used to generate 
twenty-five  sets of artificial  data  for a fifty-two-quarter  period  correspond- 
ing roughly  to the U.S. economy  from 1954:1  to 1966:4.  This  was accom- 
plished  by drawing  twenty-five  sets of normally  distributed  disturbances 
(the  uit),  and  then  solving  the model  repeatedly.28  These  twenty-five  replica- 
tions of our artificial  economy  were then used as input to the following 
estimation  exercise. 
We first followed  the statistical  procedures  that might have been em- 
ployed  by an econometrician  who  believed  Bt  and  Gt  to be exogenous-that 
is, we estimated  the six equations  (25a)-(25f)  by two-stage  least squares, 
correcting  for autocorrelation,  but employing  both Bt and Gt  as exogenous 
instruments.  The results  of this experiment  are  summarized  in columns  (2) 
26. The trend values for B* and G* were calculated by finding, in each case, the 
growth  rate that was consistent  with the observed  growth  between 1954:1 and 1966:4. 
For Y*  we took real potential  GNP as defined  by the Council  of Economic  Advisers  and 
multiplied  it by a smoothed  version of the actual  implicit GNP deflator. 
27. For  the  present section we  used ho =  -8,  hi =  -0.6,  h2 =  1.5, h3 = 0.3, 
io =  -2.76,  and i4 =  -0.2.  This corresponds  to an extremely  activist  monetary  policy 
and a considerably  less vigorous fiscal policy. 
28. Each disturbance  was generated so  as to  follow a first-order  autoregressive 
scheme,  uit  =  piUit-l  +  Ejt,  where  the estimated  pi and variances  of Ej were used (ej was 
measured  in billions  of current  dollars,  except  for equations  (25d) and (25f), where  it was 
measured  in percentage  points). These are as follows: 
i  1  2  3  4  5  6 
p  0.263  0.021  0.652  0.859  0.852  0.981 
Or,  1.46  3.19  0.68  0.15  1.46  0.38 
The reaction functions were assumed to be serially  uncorrelated  with standard  errors 
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and  (5) of Table  4, where  column  (2) contains  the average  of the twenty-five 
estimates  for each coefficient  and column (5) displays the root mean- 
squared  error  (RMSE).  The second  estimation  procedure  recognized  that 
reaction  functions  existed.29  Again using  two-stage  least squares  and cor- 
recting  for serial correlation,  we estimated  the augmented  model (25a)- 
(25i),  treating  B, and  G,  as endogenous  throughout.  Columns  (3) and  (6) of 
Table  4 report  the results  of this estimation  technique. 
The table  reveals  that there  is little to choose  between  the two methods. 
The  mean  estimates  of most parameters  are  rather  close to the true  values, 
regardless  of the estimation  method.  And,  in the  cases  where  biases  are  sub- 
stantial,  they are  comparable  for the two methods. 
Of course,  a single  sampling  experiment  cannot  be conclusive.  For one 
thing,  the kind of analysis  conducted  here  is obviously  dependent  on how 
well the reaction  functions  fit the data and on how strong  the endogenous 
policy responses  are. If reaction  functions  have only meager  explanatory 
power,  B, and G, may be considered  "almost  exogenous,"  and estimation 
biases  would probably  be negligible.  By contrast,  if the specified  reaction 
functions  fit very  tightly,  the biases  might  be substantial.  Hence,  we delib- 
erately  made  the standard  errors  of the reaction  functions  rather  small  and 
the policy responses  substantial.  Specifically,  when  we estimated  (25h) on 
our artificial  data  we obtained  R2s  of 0.70-0.80  for Bt -  B*; when  we esti- 
mated (25i), we got R2s for Gt -  G* of around 0.50-0.60. Thus these reac- 
tion functions  appear  to fit the fictitious  data rather  better  than empirical 
reaction  functions  typically  fit actual  U.S. data.  Nevertheless,  the structural 
estimation  biases-somewhat  to our surprise-turned  out to be minuscule. 
It thus appears  that the big payoff from proper treatment  of reaction 
functions  is not in improved  estimates  of the standard  structural  equations. 
Rather,  as the next section  reveals,  the benefits  come from  calculating  the 
policy multipliers  from the solved  reduced  form of the augmented  model 
rather  than from a model that excludes  the reaction  functions.  This con- 
clusion  implies  that  the  various  pitfalls  described  in this  paper  are  not cause 
for much  conern  to a fully  coordinated  set of policy  makers  since  they  pre- 
sumably  will be interested  only in the multipliers  obtained  by ignoring  all 
reaction  functions. 
29. We are obviously referring  here to reaction  functions that make Gt and Bt de- 
pendent on some current  endogenous  variables.  As noted earlier,  lagged  reactions  will 
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Computing  Multipliers  from  Structural  Models 
The first section contrasted  two basically  different  ways of computing 
policy multipliers:  The first  ignored  the existence  of reaction  functions- 
equation  (6), while the second  took appropriate  account  of them-equa- 
tion (8). We shall  now discuss  the quantitative  difference  between  the two 
types  of multipliers,  and  how it depends  on the nature  of the reaction  func- 
tions.  We consider  first  the case  where  the structural  parameters  are  known, 
and hence no estimation  problems  arise.  In practice,  of course,  the true 
structural  parameters  are  not known,  but must  be estimated,  and so we ex- 
plore subsequently  the intertwined  issues of proper  use and estimation. 
To evaluate  the consequences  of ignoring  policy reaction  functions,  we 
experimented  with a variety  of functions  following  equations  (25h) and 
(25i). These functions  imply that the authorities  have long-term  desired 
trends  for  their  policy  tools,  but  are  willing  to deviate  from  them  in response 
to stabilization  needs.30  The assumed  targets are: for output, potential 
GNP, with deviations  in either direction  treated  symmetrically;  for the 
short-term  interest  rate, interest  rate stability,  irrespective  of the level of 
rates;  and  for the balance  of trade,  a $4.5 billion  surplus.31 
One can obtain as many different  pairs of reaction  functions  as one 
wishes  simply  by varying  the underlying  parameters  of equations  (25h)  and 
(25i). Table 5 presents  the parameters  for the fourteen combinations 
(some of which are repeated)  of monetary  and fiscal  reaction  functions 
used  in our simulation  experiments. 
For each  pair  we dynamically  simulated  the Moroney-Mason  model  for 
fifty-two  quarters  (corresponding  roughly  to 1954:1-1966:4), and com- 
puted the RMSE of GNP about its target  (potential  GNP) and of the 
change  in the short-term  rate  of interest  about  the target  of zero.  These  two 
quantities,  which appear  in Table 5 under  the heading  "Y-SCORE"  and 
"RS-SCORE,"  are convenient  measures  of the effectiveness  of each pair 
of reaction  functions  as stabilizers;  zero  would,  of course,  represent  perfec- 
tion and larger  "scores"  mean  less effectiveness. 
30. This form of reaction function is  generally consistent with a  quadratic loss 
function. 
31. Hence the reaction functions considered  in this section will have io = 0 and 
ho =  -  4.5h3.  The one exception  is the reaction  function used above and described  in 
note 27. The constants,  io and ho,  clearly  have no bearing  on the marginal  responses  of 
the system. Stephen  M. Goldfeld  and  Alan  S. Blinder  619 
Table  5. Results  of Moroney-Mason  Model  for Alternative  Monetary  and 
Fiscal  Reaction  Functions 
Multiplierso 
Reaction  function parametersa  Scoresb  Monetary  Fiscal 
policy  policy 
Row  hi  h2  h3  II  Y-SCORE RS-SCORE  dY/dB*  dY/dG* 
Effect of standard  monetary  or fiscal stabilizationa 
1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  81.6  0.259  13.48  1.66 
2  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.6  41.2  0.237  6.62  0.83 
3  -0.06  1.5  0.3  0.0  41.7  0.188  6.71  0.82 
Effect of stronger  fiscal stabilization  (standard  monetary  stabilization) 
4  -0.06  1.5  0.3  0.0  41.7  0.188  6.71  0.82 
5  -0.06  1.5  0.3  -0.2  35.7  0.179  5.74  0.71 
6  -0.06  1.5  0.3  -0.6  27.6  0.176  4.45  0.55 
7  -0.06  1.5  0.3  -1.0  22.5  0.179  3.62  0.45 
Effect of stronger  monetary  stabilization  (standardfiscal stabilization) 
8  -0.02  1.5  0.3  -0.6  33.3  0.182  5.39  0.68 
9  -0.06  1.5  0.3  -0.6  27.6  0.176  4.45  0.55 
10  -0.10  1.5  0.3  -0.6  23.6  0.172  3.78  0.47 
Effect of stronger Interest  rate stabilization  (standard  fiscal stabilization) 
11  -0.06  0.5  0.3  -0.6  27.1  0.218  4.45  0.55 
12  -0.06  1.5  0.3  -0.6  27.6  0.176  4.45  0.55 
13  -0.06  6.0  0.3  -0.6  29.8  0.136  4.44  0.56 
Effect of stronger  fiscal stabilization  (weak monetary  stabilization) 
14  -0.02  1.5  0.3  -0.6  33.3  0.182  5.39  0.68 
15  -0.02  1.5  0.3  -1.0  26.2  0.185  4.21  0.53 
16  -0.02  1.5  0.3  -2.0  17.0  0.192  2.73  0.35 
17  -0.02  1.5  0.3  -3.0  12.6  0.196  2.01  0.26 
Efect  of stronger  monetary stabilization  (weak fiscal stabilization) 
18  -0.06  1.5  0.3  -0.2  35.7  0.179  5.74  0.71 
19  -0.60  1.5  0.3  -0.2  3.5  0.244  1.40  0.17 
Source: Equations (25h) and (25i) and Moroney-Mason model cited in Table 4. 
a.  The parameters  are from equations (25h) and (25i). 
b.  Y-SCORE is the root mean-squared error of  gross national product around potential GNP;  RS- 
SCORE is the root mean-squared  error for the change in the short-term rate of interest about the target of 
zero. 
c.  As the Moroney-Mason model is slightly nonlinear, the computed multiplier paths will depend on 
initial conditions. In practice, the actual variability proved to be quite trivial. 
Two further  simulations  with each set of reaction  functions  were  run  in 
order  to calculate  policy multipliers.  In particular,  we introduced  a sus- 
tained  increase  of $1 billion  in B* (or G*)  and resimulated  the model.  The 
differences  between  this set of simulations  and the corresponding  initial 
control  simulation  provided  us with a pair  of dynamic  multiplier  paths.  In 
the last two columns  of Table  5 we have  reported  the steady-state  (that  is, 
fifty-second  quarter)  multipliers  for  both  monetary  and  fiscal  policy,  labeled 
dY/dB* and dY/dG*, respectively.32 
32. The dynamic  multipliers  for some other selected time periods for the reaction 
functions  in row 19 are given in the right-hand  portion of Table 7. We also computed 
multiplier  effects on short rates but have not reported  them. 620  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3:1972 
The first  row of Table  5 corresponds  to the "degenerate"  reaction  func- 
tions, B, =  B* and Gt =  G*. In other words, the monetary base and govern- 
ment spending  are exogenous  and grow at their  trend  rates  regardless  of 
macroeconomic  conditions.  The multipliers  for this case-13.48 for B and 
1.66 for G-are  calculated  by ignoring  the existence  of the reaction  func- 
tions (and thus correspond  to equation  (6) above).  The multipliers  in the 
remaining  rows  of Table  5 (which  are  analogous  to equation  (8) above)  re- 
veal that ignoring  the reaction  functions  may lead to a striking  overstate- 
ment  of the true  multipliers.  In the table,  this overstatement  is at least  by a 
factor  of 2, and  goes as high  as a factor  of 10. 
The  table  indicates  a systematic  relationship  between  the character  of the 
reaction  function  and  the magnitude  of the multiplier.  Rows 2 and  3 intro- 
duce "standard"  monetary  or fiscal reaction  functions33  one at a time, 
while  holding  the other  authority  to the steady  growth  policy.34  These  two 
standard  policies  are of almost  identical  strength:  They  achieve  essentially 
the same Y-SCORE,  and each serves  to cut both  multipliers  in half. The 
only  difference  between  rows  2 and  3 is that  monetary  policy  (which  "cares" 
about  interest  rate  stability)  gets a noticeably  improved  RS-SCORE. 
Rows  4-7 display  the  effect  of successively  increasing  the strength  of fiscal 
policy while maintaining  the standard  monetary  reaction  function.  Rows 
8-10 deal with  strengthening  the monetary  response  to the GNP gap, with 
the standard  fiscal  reaction  function.  The  two groups  tell a similar  story:  A 
stronger  policy reduces  both the Y-SCORE  and multipliers.  Rows 11-13 
investigate  altering  the monetary  reaction  function  to attach  greater  con- 
cern  to interest  rate  stability,  and  reveals  little  effect  on the multipliers,  but 
an improvement  in the RS-SCORE  at the expense  of the Y-SCORE. 
The  final  rows  of the table  consider  some  more  extreme  combinations  of 
reaction  functions,  where  the response  of one authority  is relatively  weak 
while  the other  responds  with  increasing  strength  to the GNP gap. Within 
each group,  this steadily  reduces  the multipliers  and brings  GNP closer  to 
target  at the expense  of increasing  the variability  of interest  rates.  It will  be 
noted that when  the reactions  of either  monetary  or fiscal  policy  become 
sufficiently  strong,  the true  multipliers  can get very  small  indeed  (see rows 
17 and 19). 
Overall,  then, Table 5 provides  considerable  evidence  on the problems 
33. The coefficients  of the standard  case were obtained by calculating  the policy 
response  that would eventually  close the gap if the multipliers  were as in row 1. 
34. Thus these rows correspond  to multipliers  like equation  (8'). Stephen  M. Goldfeld  and  Alan  S. Blinder  621 
that reaction  functions  pose for multiplier  calculations.35  The results  also 
shed  some  light  on the  success  of alternative  reaction  functions  as stabilizers 
and  on the tradeoff  between  the stability  of interest  rates  and  the growth  of 
income. 
A DIGRESSION  ON THE BEHAVIOR  OF THE MONEY SUPPLY 
The widely  advocated  monetary  "rule"  of maintaining  a steady  rate of 
growth  of the  money  supply  is not obeyed  by any  of our  reaction  functions, 
not even  steady  growth  in the base.  In fact, steady  growth  in the base does 
not yield  the steadiest  monetary  growth.  The  reason  is that  while  a reaction 
function  destabilizes  the monetary  base, it tends  to stabilize  interest  rates 
and hence  the ratio of the money stock to the base; and either  effect  may 
dominate. 
These  results  all refer  to the deterministic  part of the Moroney-Mason 
model. To assess the effect of stochastic  terms,  we generated  twenty-five 
"histories"  of random  shocks  (following  the error  distributions  indicated 
by our  estimation  results)  and applied  these  to seven  versions  of the model 
-differing only in the reaction  functions  present-to generate  twenty-five 
different  time  paths  of the  money  stockfor  each  policy  rule.  We then  looked 
at the stochastic  variability  of the money  supply  under  alternative  reaction 
functions  by computing  for each quarter  the standard  deviation across 
replications.  Table  6 gives  an overview  of the results.  The first  column  re- 
ports the average  standard  deviation  over the fifty-two  quarters.  The re- 
maining  two columns  exhibit  the minimum  and maximum  standard  devia- 
tions.36 
To put these  in perspective,  it should  be noted  that a standard  deviation 
of $1.5 billion  in M corresponds  to a standard  deviation  of about 5 per- 
centage  points in the annual  growth  rate of M. On a quarter-to-quarter 
basis,  therefore,  reasonable  reaction  functions  may  lead  to substantial  vari- 
ability  in the growth  rate  of M. On the whole,  as compared  with  the steady 
growth  in the base, stabilization  formulas  generally  mitigate  the impact  of 
35. Similar  experiments  were  conducted  and analogous  results  obtained  for an alter- 
native  model developed  by Robert  S. Pindyck.  For the model see his "A Small  Quarterly 
Model of the U.S. Economy"  (April 1970; processed). 
36. It is to be expected  that the standard  deviations  would differ  from one quarter  to 
the next owing to (i) chance variations  in the sizes of the random shocks, and (ii) sys- 
tematic  variations  in the movements  of the exogenous  variables  (especially  exports)  over 
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Table  6. Stochastic  Variability  of the Money  Supply  under  Alternative 
Reaction  Functions 
Average  Smallest  Largest 
Reaction  standard  standard  standard 
function"  deviation  deviation  deviation 
1  4.04  2.24  5.55 
2  3.94  2.24  5.31 
3  3.07  1.52  4.21 
6  2.93  1.52  4.04 
13  2.97  1.40  3.99 
17  2.83  1.52  3.87 
19  4.73  2.20  6.76 
Source: Estimated from Moroney-Mason model cited in Table 4. 
a.  These are defined in the corresponding row numbers in Table 5. 
random  shocks  on the  money  stock.37  To sum  up, we find  no necessary  con- 
flict between  stability  of income  and interest  rates,  on the one hand, and 
stability  of the  money  stock,  on the  other.  A well-designed  and  well-executed 
mix  of monetary  and  fiscal  policies  can  hope  to contribute  to both  objectives. 
ESTIMATING THE MULTIPLIERS 
The multipliers  just discussed  apply  when  the true  parameters  of the un- 
derlying  model are known  exactly.  In practice,  of course,  the parameters 
would  have  to be estimated  and  then  used  to compute  the  reduced  form.  We 
now return  to the Monte  Carlo  experiment  used  above  to compute  for the 
Moroney-Mason  model  both "proper"  structural  estimates  (those  that  treat 
policy  variables  as endogenous)  and  "improper"  ones  (those  that  treat  them 
as exogenous),  and investigate  the differences  in the multipliers  calculated 
from the solved-reduced-form  multipliers  of  each of  these structural 
estimates. 
We took the twenty-five  replicated  economies  of the preceding  section- 
each  estimated  two ways-and used  each  estimated  structure  to derive  dy- 
namic  multiplier  paths  for both monetary  and fiscal  policy.  Although  the 
underlying  data  had  been  generated  in every  case  by a model  that  included 
two reaction  functions  (those  of row 19 of Table  5), we computed  dynamic 
multipliers  two ways:  First,  by ignoring  the reaction  functions,  we derived 
multipliers  analogous  to equation  (6); then  we used  the reaction  functions, 
37. The only exception  is reaction  function 19, which  is absurdly  activist.  In that one 
case, discretionary  monetary  policy  actually  makes  M more  responsive  to random  shocks 
than it is under  the steady growth  rules. Stephen  M. Goldfeld  and  Alan  S. Blinder  623 
treating  B and G as endogenous,  to compute multipliers  analogous  to 
equation  (8). For each  quarter,  we then  calculated  the mean  of the twenty- 
five  multiplier  estimates  and  their  standard  deviations.  Table  7 reports  the 
results. 
The  first  bank  of columns  in Table  7 presents  the  computations  excluding 
reaction  functions.  These  data  show  that  the  negligible  estimation  biases  ex- 
hibited  in Table  4 can  in some  cases  build  up to nonnegligible  biases  in esti- 
mating  multipliers  like (6). The average  estimated  steady-state  multiplier 
for B when  policy  is taken  as exogenous  is 15.2,  which  is somewhat  higher 
than the "true"  multiplier  of 13.5.  The multipliers  for earlier  quarters  are 
similarly  overstated,  as are the government  spending  multipliers.  Even 
when  the reaction  functions  are  included  in the multiplier  calculations,  as 
reflected  in the second bank of columns, the stochastic  multipliers  are 
slightly  (but only slightly)  higher  on average  than  the true  ones. 
In summary,  we have previously  seen that ignoring  reaction  functions 
might  lead some users  to overstate  policy  multipliers  rather  seriously,  even 
if the economic  structure  were known  perfectly, and now confirm these find- 
ings for practical  applications,  where the structure  must be estimated. 
Further,  we find  that if (and  this may be a big "if")  the reaction  function 
can be correctly  specified,  the multipliers  can be reasonably  well  estimated. 
Put another  way, the differences  between  ignoring  and taking  account  of 
correctly  estimated  reaction  functions  seem far more important  than any 
structural  estimation  problems.38 
Estimating  Reduced  Forms:  Some  Simulation  Results 
The second  section  examined  analytically  the consequences  of using  esti- 
mated  reduced-form  equations  to evaluate  policy multipliers  when  policy 
was formulated  endogenously,  and produced  rather  precise  results  for the 
large sample properties  of an extremely  simple model. But how would 
reduced-form  estimation  fare  in a more  complex  model  with  a limited  sam- 
ple size? 
To gain  some  perspective  on this, we have  utilized  the hypothetical  data 
generated  in the third  section to estimate  directly  reduced  forms for the 
38. In particular,  even if the structural  estimates  are consistent  (as in the case of a 
lagged reaction  function with serially  uncorrelated  errors),  the problem  of appropriate 
use of the models when reaction  functions  exist still remains. C's 
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Moroney-Mason  model.  That model  (equations  (25a) to (25g) above)  can 
be solved  to yield the partial  reduced-form  equation  for GNP: 
(26)  Yt =  7r0  +  7r,Gt  +  -7r2Et  +  -7r3Bt  +  -7r4(BtRDt-1)  +  r5(BtRSt_j) 
+  6Mt-1  +  7r7Ct41 +  w8Ct-2  +  w9RLt-2  +  7r1OIt-1 +  Ut. 
Several  points should be noted about equation  (26): (a) the equation  is 
linear  in contemporary  variables  but  contains  some  nonlinearities  in lagged 
variables  stemming  from  the money  supply  equation;  (b) the structure  im- 
plies a variety  of restrictions  on the ri (for example,  7ri  =  7r2); (c) because 
(26) ignores  reaction  functions  such as (25h) and (25i), it is not a true  re- 
duced  form  (that  is, not all the  right-hand  variables  are  predetermined)  and 
therefore  coefficients  such as 7ri are partial  reduced-form  multipliers  like 
(6), not true  reduced-form  multipliers  like (8). 
These  considerations  suggest  that ordinary  least squares  applied  to (26) 
should yield relatively  unsatisfactory  estimates  of the parameters,  com- 
pared  with the estimates  obtained  from a procedure  that takes  account  of 
the simultaneity.  The extent of these differences  in a concrete  case was 
assessed  by taking  the twenty-five  data samples  generated  for use in the 
third  section,  and estimating  (26) by two alternative  procedures:  (1) ordi- 
nary  least  squares  (OLS),  and  (2) two-stage  least  squares  (TSLS),  correcting 
for serial  correlation  in both cases. 
Table 8a reports,  for selected  parameters  of the partial  reduced  form, 
estimates  made  with  data  generated  under  the activist  monetary  policy  de- 
scribed  in row 19 of Table 5. The OLS estimates  seem noticeably  more 
biased  than  the TSLS  estimates.  For example,  the mean  estimate  of 71, the 
coefficient  of G, which  has a true  value  of 1.16,  is only 0.17 under  OLS  but 
rises  to 0.75  with  TSLS.39The  comparisons  based  on the mean-squared  er- 
rors  also favor  the TSLS  estimates,  but by a smaller  margin,  reflecting  the 
generally  greater  variability  of TSLS  estimates  as compared  with  OLS  esti- 
mates. On balance,  while the estimates  are relatively  better  for TSLS, in 
absolute  terms  they are not all that satisfactory,  especially  for the money 
multipliers.40 
39. Detail not in the table sheds further  light on this. For example,  the OLS estimate 
for the coefficient  of B has the wrong sign in twenty-four  out of twenty-five  cases and is 
significant  in fifteen of these. The TSLS estimates  yield only three incorrect  and sig- 
nificant  coefficients,  but still leave eighteen  incorrectly  signed coefficients. 
40. For the monetary  coefficients,  this problem  may in part reflect  multicollinearity. 
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Table 8.  Estimates of Equation (26) under  Strong Monetary and Fiscal 
Stabilization Policies 
Mean  estimates  Root  mean-squared  errors 
Ordinary  Two-stage  Ordinary  Two-stage 
True  least  least  least  least 
Parametera  value  squares  squares  squares  squares 
a. Strong  monetary  stabilization 
7rl  1.16  0.17  0.75  1.08  1.23 
T2  1.16  0.93  1.02  0.57  0.50 
7r3j  1.69  -1.32  -0.85  3.07  2.73 
7r4  -0.03  0.023  0.012  0.063  0.057 
7r5  0.014  -0.041  -0.036  0.062  0.057 
Tr6  -0.14  0.129  0.097  0.517  0.522 
b. Strong  fiscal stabilization 
7rl  1.16  -0.17  0.41  1.34  0.90 
T2  1.16  0.31  0.61  0.91  0.85 
Tr3  1.69  0.61  1.91  1.18  1.91 
7r4  -0.03  -0.009  -0.022  0.038  0.041 
Tr5  0.014  0.011  0.012  0.016  0.029 
7r6  -0.14  -0.041  -0.113  0.313  0.480 
Source: Derived from equation (26). 
a.  The parameters refer to equation (26) shown in the text. 
To examine  the same  issues  with reaction  functions  that rely  mainly  on 
fiscal  rather  than  monetary  policy,  we chose  the reaction  functions  given  in 
row 17 of Table 5, generated  some new artificial  data, and repeated  the 
experiments. 
Table  8b reveals  that  the OLS  estimates  are  again  uniformly  more  biased 
than the TSLS results,  while the two sets of estimates  have comparable 
RMSEs. It also confirms  the suggestion  of our analysis  above that the 
stronger  fiscal  reactions  increase  the OLS  biases  for the  fiscal  variables,  and 
reduce  the biases  for the monetary  variables.  With  the relative  weakness  of 
monetary  action,  the money  multipliers  improve  in accuracy  for both OLS 
and TSLS and, in fact, are remarkably  close to the true values  for TSLS 
tive forms along with the lagged money stock. Imposing  the restrictions  implied by the 
structure  is one way of getting around these problems.  But this is just another way of 
saying that unrestricted  least squares estimation of the reduced form is an inefficient 
means of estimating  the solved reduced  form. 
However, since this problem appears  to disappear  in the "strong  fiscal policy" case 
considered  next, it may well stem from some simultaneity  problems. Stephen  M. Goldfeld  and  Alan S. Blinder  627 
(though  the RMSEs  are  large).  The  fiscal  multipliers,  while  distinctly  better 
for TSLS,4'  still  leave  much  to be desired. 
On  balance,  estimation  of unrestricted  reduced  forms,  even  if done  prop- 
erly,  is not a particularly  good technique  for evaluating  policy  multipliers. 
There  appears  to be no simple  substitute  for specifying  reaction  functions 
and estimating  the complete  structure. 
As a final  illustration  of the pitfalls  in reduced-form  estimation,  we ex- 
amine  how a simple  St. Louis equation  would  perform  in a world  that in 
fact accorded  with  the Moroney-Mason  model.  The St. Louis  equation,  as 
it appears  in the work of Andersen  and Carlson,  is 
(27)  AYt =  ZwjABt_j+7  'AG,,+  ut. 
If estimated  by OLS,  it would  suffer  from  problems  of both omitted  vari- 
ables  and  simultaneity.  In the  present  instance,  as we see  it, a somewhat  bet- 
ter St. Louis-type  equation  could be constructed  if the investigator  knew 
all the exogenous  variables  in the underlying  structural  model. He might 
then fit the following  equation: 




Equation  (28)  can  be viewed  as a linear  approximation  to the  final  form42  of 
the Moroney-Mason  model where  B, RD, and (G +  E) are regarded  as 
exogenous  variables. 
We estimated  both  (27)  and  (28)  for each  of the  two sets  of data  described 
above,  that is, one set with predominantly  monetary  stabilization  and the 
other  with  predominantly  fiscal  stabilization.  We employed  the Almon  lag 
technique  with a fourth-degree  polynomial  and a seven-quarter  lag.43  The 
results  are reported  in Table  9. 
Since  both  (27)  and  (28)  attempt  to assess  the impact  of B and  G when  no 
endogenous  reactions  occur,  the relevant  "true"  multipliers  would  appear 
41. Some relevant  detail helps to supplement  the information  in the table. The fiscal 
multiplier  from OLS is incorrectly  signed in twenty-four  of twenty-five  cases and is 
significant  in ten of these.  For TSLS,  almost  the reverse  is true:  Nineteen  have  the correct 
sign and thirteen  of these are significant. 
42. The final  form  for Y expresses  Y as a function  of current  and lagged  values of the 
exogenous variables  and lagged values of  Y. The approximation  would stem from the 
linearization  and from the particular  form assumed  for the lag patterns  in (28). 
43. Andersen  and Carlson  used a fourth-degree  polynomial  with five lags. However, 
since in the present  case-see  Table 7-the  lags are somewhat  longer, the use of seven 
lags seemed  fairer.  We also ran  the regressions  under  the Andersen-Carlson  lag specifica- 
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Table 9.  Reduced-form  Estimates of Monetary and Fiscal Policy 
Multipliers 
Average  sum of lag coefficientsa 
Unborrowed  Government 
reserves plus  purchases, Gb  Discount  rate, 
Policy and equation  currency,  B  plus exports,  E  RD 
Strong  monetary  stabilization 
Equation  (27)  1.90  2.77  ... 
(11.74)  (1.74) 
Equation  (28)  3.38  1.63  -3.60 
(10.23)  (0.67)  (11.93) 
Strong fiscal  stabilization 
Equation  (27)  3.95  0.36  ... 
(9.72)  (1.32) 
Equation  (28)  4.01  0.42  -0.76 
(9.80)  (1.27)  (14.19) 
True steady-state multipliers 
(ignoring  reaction  functions)  13.48  1.66  -14.71 
Source: Derived from equations (27) and (28). 
a.  Numbers in parentheses are the root mean-squared errors. 
b. In equation (28) this variable is government purchases plus exports, 
to be those  excluding  reaction  functions,  which  are  entered  in the final  row 
of the table.  Under  a regime  of strong  monetary  policy,  (28) yields  a rather 
good estimate  of the government  spending  multiplier  but, as expected,  a 
marked  understatement  (as well as very  large  sampling  variability)  for the 
base  and  discount  rate  multipliers.  Equation  (27), which also suffers  from 
omitted-variables  bias, gives even more unsatisfactory  results,  in terms  of 
both biases  and RMSEs. 
Under a regime  of strong fiscal policy, equation  (28), though slightly 
superior  to (27), gives a highly unsatisfactory  fiscal  multiplier.  The base 
multiplier  is improved  but still strongly  understates  the true  multiplier,  and 
the discount  rate multiplier  is worse  yet. Both equations  are highly unre- 
liable, as illustrated  by the large  RMSEs.  It appears  that equations  of the 
St. Louis type are not likely  to resolve  our problems. 
RECAPITULATION 
We have analyzed  from a variety  of points of view the estimation  of 
policy multipliers  in the face of conscious  stabilization  actions.  Our  basic 
conclusion  is that,  for a rather  broad  range  of plausible  behavior  patterns  of 
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outside  economist,  requires  explicit  recognition  of reaction  functions.  Both 
analytically  and via sampling  experiments,  we have shown that reduced- 
form  estimation  will  not suffice.  A more  structural  approach-including  the 
reaction  functions-is  required.  Even if the remainder  of the model is 
pinned  down with a high degree  of precision,  ignoring  the reaction  func- 
tions may  well  give a very  misleading  picture  of policy. 
Correspondingly,  in an environment  with incomplete  coordination,  a 
policy maker  who neglects  the behavior  of other government  authorities 
can commit  significant  policy  errors.  We have investigated  this possibility 
in terms  of the stabilization  functions  of the administration  and the Fed- 
eral  Reserve  but  the  point  applies  more  generally  to any  systematic  behavior 
within  the public  sector.  For example,  some  macro  models  already  provide 
for an endogenous  determination  of state and local government  spending. 
Similarly,  researchers  have  begun  to examine  the behavior  of agencies  such 
as the  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board  and  the  Federal  National  Mortgage 
Association  that  can  have  a major  impact  on savings  flows,  mortgage  funds, 
and the housing  sector.44 
This  trend  is a desirable  one and  has  important  ramifications  for  the con- 
struction  and refinement  of large-scale  macroeconometric  models.  The re- 
sults  of this  study  suggest  that  more  of the  resources  devoted  to such  models 
should  be directed  toward  provisional  attempts  at specifying  and  estimating 
behavioral  relationships  for the public  sector.  Of course,  this is not an easy 
task. 
Specifying  and  Estimating  Empirical  Reaction  Functions 
Previous  sections  established  that the severity  of the various  problems 
posed by reaction  functions  is strongly  dependent  on the character  of the 
functions  employed.  It is thus extremely  important  to get at least a crude 
handle  on both the qualitative  and  quantitative  nature  of the reaction  func- 
tions that have  characterized  U.S. policy  making.  This  section  focuses  first 
on a number  of pitfalls  in specifying  and  estimating  reaction  functions,  and 
then on some actual  attempts  to do so. In view of the serious  conceptual 
problems  that undermine  the empirical  work, the results  are surprisingly 
good and  seem  to hold out the hope that  better  specifications  could  lead  to 
still better  equations. 
44. W. L. Silber,  "A Model of FHLB and FNMA Behavior,"  forthcoming  in Review 
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SOME CONCEPTUAL  PROBLEMS 
In many ways, the problems  in specifying  reaction  functions  are quite 
general,  resembling  the difficulties  encountered  in fitting,  say, a consump- 
tion function.  Reaction  functions  have  their  analogs  to the key decisions  in 
formulating  a consumption  function,  such  as reliance  on the hypothesis  of 
utility  maximization,  the length  of the planning  horizon,  the degree  of com- 
modity  aggregation,  the choice  of a certainty  or an uncertainty  model,  the 
nature  of expectations,  and efforts  to integrate  labor-leisure  or portfolio 
choices  with the consumption  decision. 
Formal treatments  of policy making-as  exemplified  by the work of 
Theil,  Brainard,  Chow,  and  others-generally  start  with  a quadratic  prefer- 
ence  function  for  the  policy  maker  that  is to be maximized  subject  to the un- 
derlying  economic  model as he perceives  it. Given this model, the mech- 
anism  by which  forecasts  are  generated,  and  the optimal  values  of the target 
variables,  the utility-maximization  hypothesis  could  be used  to derive  opti- 
mal policy  rules. 
There  are a number  of variations  on this general  theme.  For example,  a 
one-period  horizon  would  lead  to a policy  rule  of the sort considered  in the 
third and fourth sections,  while a multiperiod  horizon  would result  in a 
more  complex  lagged  feedback  policy  rule  of the kind  considered  by Chow. 
As Brainard  points  out, policy  rules  may  also differ  if the authorities  attach 
a degree  of uncertainty  to their  multiplier  estimates  instead  of treating  them 
as known  constants.  One  also  has a choice  of the  degree  of aggregation,  and 
the specification  of complex  interrelationships  between  monetary  and  fiscal 
decision  making. 
The appropriate  degree  of aggregation  assumes  particular  importance  in 
the present  context.  In general,  each stabilization  authority  will have sev- 
eral  weapons  at its disposal.  For example,  the fiscal  authority  might  control 
federal  purchases,  transfer  payments,  and several  tax rates.  This suggests 
estimating  either  a set of reaction  functions  (one for each instrument)  or 
a single  reaction  function  explaining  a combined  measure  of fiscal  influence 
such as the weighted  full employment  surplus.  The choice  depends  on the 
manner  in which  policy was actually  formulated.  If, during  the period  in 
question,  the fiscal  authorities  treated  each  instrument  as one ingredient  of 
a fiscal "portfolio,"  in the manner  suggested  by Brainard,  then a set of 
interrelated  reaction  functions  should be estimated.  Alternatively,  if the Stephen  M. Goldfeld  and  Alan  S. Blinder  631 
choices  of fiscal  instruments  were  essentially  arbitrary  or political,  and the 
government  cared  only about some overall  measure  of fiscal  influence,  a 
single  reaction  function  for that  overall  measure  is in order.  This  procedure 
requires  knowledge  of the strength  that the government  attributes  to each 
policy tool in computing  its aggregate  measure  of stimulus  or restraint, 
that is, of the government's  model of the economy. 
While  efforts  have  been  made  to construct  a unified  measure  of net fiscal 
influence,45  and  a single  measure  of monetary  influence,46  these  results  have 
not been  used  systematically  to specify  the  dependent  variable  for  a reaction 
function.  This  is a potentially  fruitful  area  for future  research. 
A still  more  serious  problem  arises  if the fiscal  and  monetary  authorities 
coordinate  their actions perfectly  so as to arrive  at an appropriate  total 
stabilization  package,  but use some  arbitrary  procedures  for allocating  the 
burden  between  themselves.  A single  reaction  function  is then  needed  with 
some  measure  of the net influence  of both  fiscal  and monetary  policy  as the 
dependent  variable.  In practice,  fiscal  and monetary  policies  are not per- 
fectly  coordinated.  But  so long as some  cooperation  exists,  it must  be recog- 
nized  in any serious  effort  to estimate  reaction  functions. 
The stability  of behavioral  relations  over time also plagues  macroeco- 
nomic model building  generally,  and the estimation  of reaction  functions 
particularly.  For the fiscal  authorities,  a change  in the political  administra- 
tion is quite  likely  to alter  reaction  patterns  for at least  three  reasons.  First, 
the new administration  may have different  ideas  about  the relative  impor- 
tance  to be attached  to the various  goals of policy. Second,  the economic 
model held by the government  may be revised.  Third,  a new relationship 
between  the executive  and legislative  branches  may  affect  the mix of stabi- 
lization  instruments.  Such  political  changes  may even  sway  the conduct  of 
monetary  policy-especially where  questions  of fiscal-monetary  coordina- 
tion are concerned. 
45. See, for example, Edward M. Gramlich, "Measures  of the Aggregate  Demand 
Impact of the Federal Budget," in Wilfred Lewis, Jr. (ed.), Budget  Concepts  for Eco- 
nomic Analysis (Brookings  Institution, 1968); and William H.  Oakland, "Budgetary 
Measures  of Fiscal Performance,"  Southern  Economic  Journal,  Vol. 35 (April 1969),  pp. 
347-58. This literature  is summarized  in the forthcoming  survey of fiscal policy by 
Blinder  and Solow. 
46. James  S. Duesenberry,  "Tactics  and Targets  of Monetary  Policy," in Controlling 
Monetary  Aggregates,  Proceedings  of the Monetary  Conference  Sponsored  by the Fed- 
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Further,  quite apart  from changing  administrations,  the attention  that 
the authorities  pay to the competing  goals of macro policy may change 
subtly  over time. For example,  if the Fed gears  policy sometimes  toward 
reducing  unemployment,  and sometimes  toward  lowering  the balance-of- 
payments  deficit,  estimation  becomes  very difficult  indeed. A small but 
growing  econometric  literature  explores  ways to handle  such problems,47 
and  these  techniques  could  be fruitfully  applied  to the  estimation  of reaction 
functions. 
In sum,  before  we can hope to do a good  job of explaining  stabilization 
policies  endogenously,  we may  have  to (a) devise  better  summary  measures 
for fiscal  and  monetary  influence;  (b) find  ways  of building  into models  the 
complex  interactions  between  fiscal  and monetary  policy making;  and (c) 
develop  more refined  techniques  for estimating  behavioral  relations  that 
are subject  to abrupt  structural  change. 
A SURVEY  OF EXISTING  EMPIRICAL WORK 
Such thorny conceptual  and statistical  problems  have rarely  stopped 
those  interested  in policy  from  pursuing  their  investigations,  and  the case  of 
reaction  functions  is no exception.  The  literature  contains  a modest  number 
of studies  that estimate  behavioral  relations  for policy  makers.  These  stud- 
ies have  examined  (and  generally  accepted)  the hypothesis  that  the authori- 
ties  have  behaved  in a manner  more  or less consistent  with  the formal  opti- 
mization  scheme  outlined  above.48  Most of these  studies  have focused  on 
central  bank behavior,  but one has concerned  itself with some federal 
agencies,  and  another  has considered  both the fiscal  and  monetary  authori- 
ties of the United States.  A brief  review  will help  to bring  out the flavor  of 
the results  as well  as how the authors  have  attempted  to come  to grips  with 
some of the pitfalls  discussed  above. 
One  of the arliest  and  best-known  studies  is that  of Wood,  who  explained 
open market  operations  in 1952-63  by both "defensive"  and "dynamic" 
47. Most of this is summarized  in Stephen M. Goldfeld and Richard E. Quandt, 
Nonlinear  Methods  in Econometrics  (Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1972), Chap. 9. 
48. In addition,  some writers  have  been concerned  with deducing  the preference  func- 
tions of the authorities.  See, for example,  Ann F. Friedlaender,  "Macro  Policy Goals in 
the Postwar  Period: A Study in Revealed  Preference,"  Discussion  Paper  6 (Boston Col- 
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considerations.49  A variable  defined  as "other  factors  affecting  reserves"  is 
used  to capture  the defensive  element  in open market  operations.  The dy- 
namic  variables  include  some of the typical  stabilization  objectives  as well 
as the national  debt held outside  the Treasury,  which  is included  because 
the Fed usually  assists  the Treasury  in financing  operations.  One  important 
feature  of Wood's specification,  which  has not been followed  up in later 
work,  is the inclusion  of a rough  measure  of fiscal  influence  that  attempts  to 
take  some  account  of the  coordination  between  the  stabilization  authorities. 
Wood also approximates  an overall  measure  of monetary  impact,  by cor- 
recting  open market  operations  for changes  in reserve  requirements.  His 
specification  makes  the  policy  variable  a function  of several  current  endoge- 
nous  variables,  and  he handles  the simultaneity  problem  by using  two-stage 
least  squares.  His overall  conclusion  is that  while  the bulk of the Fed's ac- 
tions are aimed  at offsetting  other  factors  affecting  reserves,  a significant 
portion of its behavior  is in systematic  response  to "targets  and target 
variables  specified  in the Employment  Act of 1946."50 
The temporal  stability  of coefficients  has been subjected  to extensive 
scrutiny  by Christian,  who used twenty-seven  overlapping  sample  periods 
to examine  the stability  of the Dewald and Johnson  reaction  functions.5' 
For each  of these  periods  he related  several  possible  monetary  control  vari- 
49. John H. Wood, "A Model of Federal Reserve Behavior,"  in George Horwich 
(ed.), Monetary  Process  and  Policy (Richard  D. Irwin, 1967),  pp. 135-66. Wood's study 
contains a careful  treatment  of the formal framework  that is sketchily  outlined above 
and has strongly  influenced  a number  of subsequent  studies,  such as Raymond  G. Torto, 
"An Endogenous.  Treatment of Open-Market Operations" (paper presented at the 
Twenty-ninth  Annual Conference  of the Southern Economic Association, St. Louis, 
November 1969; processed). 
50. Wood, "Model of Federal Reserve Behavior,"  p. 156. Other early studies that 
reached  similar conclusions  include the following: William G. Dewald and Harry G. 
Johnson,  "An Objective  Analysis  of the Objectives  of American  Monetary  Policy, 1952- 
61," in Deane Carson  (ed.), Banking  and  Monetary  Studies  (Richard  D. Irwin,  1963),  pp. 
171-89;  Stephen M.  Goldfeld, Commercial  Bank Behavior and Economic Activity 
(Amsterdam:  North-Holland,  1966),  pp. 188-90; Thomas  Havrilesky,  "A Test of Mone- 
tary  Policy Action,"  Journal  of Political  Economy,  Vol. 75 (June  1967),  pp. 299-304; and 
Grant L. Reuber, "The Objectives  of Canadian  Monetary  Policy, 1949-61: Empirical 
'Trade-offs'  and the Reaction  Function  of the Authorities,"  Journal  ofPolitical  Economy, 
Vol. 72 (April 1964),  pp. 109-32. 
51. James W. Christian,  "A Further  Analysis of the Objectives  of American  Mone- 
tary  Policy,"  Journal  of Finance,  Vol. 23 (June  1968),  pp. 465-77. It should be noted that 
Reuber,  in "Objectives  of Canadian  Monetary  Policy,"  tested his reaction  functions  for 
stability  and found no indication  of structural  change. 634  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  3:1972 
ables to the various stabilization  objectives  employed  by Dewald and 
Johnson.  Overall,  he reinforces  the evidence  given  by Wood, but he finds 
considerable  instability,  especially  with  respect  to the  inflation  and  balance- 
of-payments  objectives.  In particular,  these  latter  two variables  tend to be 
significant  only  in sample  periods  in which  price  stability  and  the  balance  of 
payments  drew  much  official  concern.  Christian  leaves  open  the question  of 
whether  preferences  have changed  or a more  complicated  preference  func- 
tion is needed.  The thrust  of his argument  strongly  suggests  the need for 
some  other  techniques  of estimation. 
Keran  and Babb have provided  another  attempt  at explaining  Federal 
Reserve  behavior.52  In the general  spirit of Wood's work, they related 
changes  in the monetary  base to a proxy  for stabilization  objectives,53  a 
measure  of interest  rate stability,  and the change  in the debt held outside 
trust  accounts  (the last as a measure  of "even-keel"  financing  needs).  At a 
technical  level, Keran  and Babb  make the valuable  point that the use of 
quarterly  changes  in the monetary  base  as a dependent  variable  reduces  the 
need  for explanatory  variables  measuring  "defensive"  policy  actions,  since, 
if open market  operations  are used to smooth  out other  factors  affecting 
reserves,  the monetary  base  need  not be affected  by these  factors.  They  do, 
however,  employ  some "defensive"  variables  in their monthly  equations 
explaining  open  market  operations.  The authors  examine  their  basic  equa- 
tion for structural  stability,  but  only  by the simple  expedient  of using  a shift 
variable  to distinguish  between  political administrations.  They find this 
shift variable  to be highly  significant,  suggesting  that the behavior  of the 
Fed may  be subject  to the kinds  of political  shifts  described  earlier. 
Finally  Friedlaender  has  made  a noteworthy  effort  to estimate  individual 
reaction  functions  for each of three  monetary  variables  (the discount  rate, 
open market  operations,  and reserve  requirements)  and three  fiscal  vari- 
ables  (government  spending,  personal  taxes,  and  corporate  taxes).  As noted 
above,  whether  this disaggregation  is appropriate  depends  on the underly- 
ing nature  of coordination  in the policy  process.  Friedlaender  estimates  all 
six functions  separately  for Republican  and Democratic  administrations, 
52. Michael  W. Keran  and Christopher  T. Babb,  "An Explanation  of Federal  Reserve 
Actions (1933-68)," Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, Vol. 51 (July 1969), 
pp. 7-20. 
53. One major drawback  of the Keran-Babb  study is the rather  strained  use of free 
reserves  as a single proxy for income, balance-of-payments,  price, and unemployment 
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and again finds that substantial  differences  emerge  for both fiscal and 
monetary  authorities. 
Taken  as a whole,  this  brief  review  uncovers  at least  modest  evidence  that 
reaction  functions  do in fact exist.  Furthermore,  virtually  all of the studies 
cited  use current  endogenous  variables  to explain  policy  behavior.  As a re- 
sult,  the estimation  problems  stressed  earlier  in this paper  appear  to be very 
real ones. Certainly,  further  research  along these lines seems  to be called 
for.  As a matter  of strategy,  the most sensible  approach  might  be to investi- 
gate reaction  functions  in the context  of a specific  econometric  model.  On 
the one hand,  such  an investigation  would  guide  the specification  of the de- 
pendent  variables  for  the reaction  functions.  On  the other  hand,  integration 
of a reaction  function  into a complete  model is the only way in which  to 
assess the consequences  of any particular  policy rule. Allowing for this 
two-way  interaction  between  the  model  and  the  reaction  functions  would  be 
an important  contribution  to understanding  of the policy  process. 
APPENDIX 
Derivation  of Equations 
Most of the bias formulas  presented  in the section  entitled  "Problems  in 
Estimating  Reduced-form  Equations"  can be viewed  as special  cases  of the 
following  general  model.  Assume  that income  is determined  by the simple 
partial  reduced-form  equation: 
(A-1)  Yt  = R + aFt + OMt  +et. 
Assume  further  that  the correlation  between  Ft and  Et is PF,  the correlation 
between M, and Et is PM,  and the correlation between F, and M, is r. If the 
symbol  Cxy denotes  the sample  covariance  between  X and Y, the expres- 
sions for the ordinary  least squares  regression  coefficients  are 
CFY  CMM  -  CYM  CFM 





a  CYM  CFF  -  CYF  CFM 
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Substituting  the various  moments  into (A-2), and taking  probability  limits 
yields 
= plim  _  PpF-rPM  R 
a  +(1  -  r2)(aSF/oE,) 
(A-3)  P1hM A  pM-rpF  R  P  A  PM -rPF 
=  a  (1-r2)(3SM/1o)' 
where SF, SM, and (>e are the standard deviations of Ft, Mt, and Et,  respec- 
tively. 
In the model  of equations  (14)  and  (15)  in the text,  it is a trivial  matter  to 
calculate  that 
SP =  O-e(I  +  PyY  =SM  =  O- 
(1 +  32)1 
(A-4)  PF =  (1+y)  PM  =  -(I  +  32)& 
1 + pIy 
(I  +  y2)1(1  +  32)1,, 
where  the symbols  p, 'y,  and  a are  defined  as in the text. Substitution  of all 
these expressions  into (A-3) yields  equation  (16). 
An Alternative  Forecasting  Rule 
William  Poole has pointed  out to us that the forecasts  EF and EM  as de- 
scribed  in the text are suboptimal  forecasts.  In particular,  they have a 
larger  mean-squared  error  than an alternative  set of forecasts,  EF and EM 
which  have  the following  simple  relation  to our old forecasts: 
*  2  *  2 
EF  PF  F,  EM 
=  PM  EF 
The  essential  difference  is that,  whereas  EF and  EM  had  the property  that  the 
forecast errors were uncorrelated with E, the true value, eF and EM  are such 
that  the errors  are  uncorrelated  with  the forecasts  themselves. 
Fortunately,  this new forecasting  scheme  can be accommodated  by a 
trivial  modification.  In particular,  we need only change  the reaction  func- 
tions  (equations  (14)  in the text)  to 
*  _  =_PF2  2  2 
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This  leaves  PF, PM,  and r as in (A-4) and  lowers  the standard  deviations  of 
F and M to 
SF =  pF-e(1  +  Y)Y  =  P 2SF  FaF 
M =  PM a  (I  +  6  )  m 
-  PM SM. 
Substituting  these  into (A-3) yields  the expressions 
Ra-  1 = (I +,y2)(R"  1) 
R(5-1  =  (1 +  32)(R  -1), 
where  Ro and Ro are the expressions  given  in equation  (16). Inspection  of 
(A-5) shows  that this alteration  in the forecasting  scheme  in no way alters 
the basic story.  As expected,  the improved  forecasts  aggravate  the biases: 
Ra  and  RO  are  further  from  unity  than  Ro  and  Ro  were.  However,  the signs 
of the biases are in no way affected,  and neither  is our conclusion  about 
which authority  gets the larger  percentage  bias (see proposition  4 in the 
text). To see this, divide  the two equations  in (A-5) to get 
RC,- 1 _  +  2)  Ra  _  I 
RI'- I  (I  +  a2)  o-  I 
According to  proposition 4,  the ratio (Ro -  1)/(RO  -  1) will be greater 
than  unity  if and  only  if y is greater  than  S. But,  by the above  equation,  this 
will certainly mean that (Ra -  1)/(RO  -  1) is greater  than unity as well. 
Standard  Errors 
Tables 2 and 3 report  hypothetical  t-ratios  based on the asymptotic 
standard  errors  of the estimators,  d and  :.  For the basic  model  these stan- 
dard  errors  are given  by 
Sa = ayS[(l -  p2)'  (1  +  32)i]/A 
(A-6)  Si  =  Oy3[(1  -  p2)1 (1  +  y2)1]/A, 
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Policy  Interactions 
In this  case,  the monetary  authority  forecasts  and  attempts  to offset  both 
e and fiscal policy. The model now consists of the partial  reduced-form 
equation  (A-1), the reaction  functions  (23) in the text, and an equation  to 
generate  the Fed's  forecasts  of fiscal  behavior:  t  F +  e, where  the fore- 
cast  error,  e, is assumed  to have  variance  r2f2 , and  to be uncorrelated  with 
F,  , UF, and UM.  The derivation  proceeds  exactly  as in the simpler  case.  We 
compute  the expressions  for SF, SM, PF, PM, and  r, substitute  these  into the 
general  formulas  (A-3), and simplify  to obtain 
(A-7)  -  1 +  (p,  -  5) ?  sy(p8 
-  'y) 
-  X(sa-r)2 
'A +  (sa_r)2  (1 +  72) 
(A-8)  R'3I1+  C75-7 
A +  (sa_r)2  (1 +  'y2)' 
Comparing  (A-8) with the corresponding  expression  in (19), we find no 
change  in the sign of the bias in estimating  the monetary  multiplier,  but a 
decrease  in the absolute  magnitude.  Furthermore,  this decrease  diminishes 
as the Fed's accuracy  in predicting  fiscal actions  improves  (that is, as r 
shrinks).  These  are the results  cited  in proposition  8. 
Proposition  9 is less obvious.  To simplify  things  a bit, let the symbols 
Ra and Rf denote  the expressions  for the biases in equations  (19). Then 
(A-7) can be rewritten  as: 
(A-9)  R- -1  = (R-  -  1) 0 +  (R'1  -1)  (iS) -  _  X  (sa-r)2 
where 
A<  A+(sa-r)2(1  2< 
Thus,  in the most plausible  case, where  R1 <  1 and  R: <  1 (that  is, where 
both  biases  were  downward  before  the  Fed  began  anticipating  fiscal  policy), 
the fiscal  policy  multiplier  will again  be biased  downward.  In the other  pos- 
sible case, where either (Ra -  1) or (Rf -  1), but not both, is positive, it is 
still quite  likely  that a-  will be biased  down once the Fed begins  predicting 
fiscal policy. Ra -  1 may even be negative though R1 -  1 is positive. These 
are  the results  cited  in proposition  9 of the text. Stephen  M. Goldfeld  and  Alan  S. Blinder  639 
Model  with  an Exogenous  Variable 
The last model considered  in the text expands  the partial  reduced-form 
equation  to 
(A-10)  Y, = k +  aF,  + OM, +  1X: +  e, 
where  X is an exogenous  variable.  The reaction  functions  are correspond- 
ingly expanded,  as in equations  (24). We introduce  the following  assump- 
tions about  the forecasts  of X: 
XF  =  X+  VF  XM  =  X+  VM 
Var(vF)  _  Jf =  C2  az  Var(vM)  =  d2 o- 
E(VFVM)  =  Pv 0ff  0m- 
We  further  assume  that  the vs  are  uncorrelated  with  UF, UM  X, and  e. It can 
be shown  that  the relative  biases  in each  coefficient  in (A-10)  are 
Ra  =  1 + Kg*[g28(py -  8) +  2d(cpv  -  d)] 
(A-1)  RO  =  1  +  ,A*  [g22(p8-  ) +  2c(dpv  -  c)] 
=  1 +  ag*[g2{8  (py  -  8) +  y(pa  -  y)}  +  p2{d(prcC-  d) +  c(pvdd  -c) 
where 
-*  g4[A  +  (A2Cd)2(l  -P)] 
and 
Sufficient  conditions  for all of the biases  to be negative  can be easily  de- 
rived.  First  note that  if both p and  pv  are  nonpositive,  equations  (A-I1) im- 
mediately  imply  that all coefficient  estimates  are  biased  toward  zero. Thus 
we need worry  only about cases in which  p or Pv, or both, is positive. 
Suppose  first  that  p is positive  while  Pv  is not. Then  by (A-1  1), the sufficient 
conditions  are  py -  8 < 0; p8  -  -y < 0. As demonstrated  in the text these 
can be written  in the more  compact  form, 
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Now turn  to the case where  pv,  but not p, is positive.  The sufficient  condi- 
tions derived from (A-I1) become pc  -  d <  0; pvd  -  c <  0, or simply 
(A-13)  I>  d 
> P. 
P  C 
Finally,  in the case  where  both  p and  PV  are  positive,  jointly  sufficient  condi- 
tions for all biases  to be downward  are that both (A-12)  and (A-13)  hold. 
Proposition  10  in the text assumes  that  both of these  conditions  are  met. Comments  and 
Discussion 
John  Kareken:  I found  this  paper  not only  very  good  but  very  encouraging  in 
suggesting  that endogenous  policy  responses  do not necessarily  impair  the 
structural  estimation  of the workings  of the economy  and  economic  policy. 
Even  though  that conclusion  is balanced  precariously  on one observation, 
it is still  cause  for encouragement.  One  can  reasonably  assume  a centralized 
stabilization  authority  for purposes  of extracting  optimal  fiscal  and mone- 
tary  policy  rules.  I would  have  been  happier  if the authors  had  actually  done 
more  experiments,  systematically  altering  the  variances  in the  reaction  func- 
tions,  although  I have  no basis  for  questioning  their  judgment  that  it takes  a 
lot to get a perceptible  difference  in the estimation. 
I was also encouraged  to find  several  additional  explanations  of the de- 
fects in reduced-form  models  like that of the St. Louis Federal  Reserve. 
But  I am  not persuaded  by the explanation  that  the Fed is a poor  forecaster 
compared  with, say, the Council  of Economic  Advisers  or the Treasury. 
That  may  have  been  true  in the early  1960s  but I do not believe  it has been 
true  recently. 
The analysis  in the paper  depends  on the existence  of a reaction  function 
for the fiscal  authority.  There  seem to be several  fiscal  authorities  in our 
government;  implementing  fiscal  policy  has been one of the greatest  diffi- 
culties  of the  postwar  period,  and  from  reading  the newspapers,  I gather  the 
problem  is still alive.  Indeed,  I am surprised  that Goldfeld  and Blinder  are 
able to report  any fiscal  policy reaction  functions  that seem  to fit history. 
Finally, in analyzing  the sources  of statistical  bias, I would have pre- 
ferred  not to assume  that the authorities  react  to current  observations,  for 
by definition  they  cannot  have  done  so. The  paper  implies  that  the decision 
period for policy is shorter  than the observation  period for the data. A 
multitude  of problems  arises  if one really  believes  that  the Federal  Reserve 
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or some other  authority  is making  monthly  decisions.  If the proper  model 
is a monthly  one but a quarterly  model  is estimated,  an important  problem 
of aggregation  through  time  arises,  which  should  be treated  explicitly. 
William  Poole: For two reasons,  I agree  with  Kareken  that  the problem  of 
bias from  endogenous  policy  elements  is unlikely  to be important  in prac- 
tice. First, as Kareken  says, policy makers  are not going to respond  very 
much  to the error  term  in the concurrent  quarter  because  they cannot  ob- 
serve  it. Even  if they  do respond  to preliminary  data,  those  data  are  likely  to 
be quite  different  from  the ultimately  revised  data  that  are  used  in statistical 
estimation  of parameters;  and  hence  bias from  simultaneity  is not likely  to 
be severe.  Second,  most policy effects  occur with substantial  lags, which 
models  try  to capture  through  distributed  lags. It is likely  that only a small 
part of the total sum of the distributed  lag is subject  to the simultaneity 
problem,  and  hence  the long-run  multipliers  and  the total policy  effects  are 
not likely  to be seriously  biased. 
The authors  spend  much of their  effort  criticizing  simple  reduced-form 
models  like  the St. Louis  approach  (just  as proponents  of such  models  seem 
inordinately  preoccupied  with  criticizing  large  structural  models).  I wonder 
why  so much  time  is devoted-on both  sides-to  talking  about  how  bad the 
"wrong"  models  are,  rather  than  to developing  the right  ones. 
To a considerable  extent,  the analysis  of this paper  is stacked  against  the 
St. Louis  approach.  The  authors  have  generated  numbers  for a hypothetical 
economy that is precisely  specified  by a simultaneous-equations  model. 
Two different  approaches  are  estimated,  one recognizing  and one ignoring 
endogenous  policy. The reduced-form  equations  are then estimated,  and 
they are full of problems.  But their problems  arise  not because  they are 
reduced-form  equations  but because  they are  misspecified.  Let me put the 
point this way: Suppose  that the hypothetical  data were  generated  from  a 
model  in which  the investment  equation  contains  the long-term  bond rate 
lagged  two quarters.  Suppose,  now,  that  the equation  is estimated  with  only 
the current  long-term  bond rate.  That  misspecified  equation  will be defec- 
tive even though  it is structural. 
Critics  of structural  models  argue  that  they  are  very  likely  to be misspeci- 
fied, so that they produce  the wrong  cofficients  and results  more  mislead- 
ing and more troublesome  than those emerging  from the reduced-form 
approach.  The  question  is, Which  model  is likely  to cause  the  most  trouble? 
The  best  evidence  bearing  on that  question  comes  from  examination  of how 
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which  of all  the  things  a priori  reasoning  tells  us can  go wrong  does  go wrong. 
In my  judgment  the Andersen-Jordan  model  has performed  poorly  outside 
the  period  from  which  it was  estimated.  When  I looked at this about  a year 
ago, I had  thirteen  quarters  of observations  beyond  the sample  period.  The 
bias  in the GNP estimate  over  that  period  averaged  $4 billion  per quarter, 
or a cumulative  error  in the level of $53 billion.  I suspect  that larger  struc- 
tural  models  reveal  the same  defects,  although  because  they contain  many 
more lagged  variables,  they may not go off course  quite so fast. I would 
guess that the 1968 version  of the Federal  Reserve  model, for example, 
would not look very good right now in a true dynamic  simulation.  The 
trouble  with econometric  models is not that things  might  go wrong,  but 
that they do in fact go wrong. 
General  Discussion 
Robert Solow suggested  that the problems  of endogenous  elements  in 
policy  that Goldfeld  and Blinder  discussed  extended  even  to cases  without 
an explicit  policy  reaction  function.  In the first  place,  automatic  stabilizers 
work  much  as a reaction  function  does in responding  contemporaneously 
to economic  developments;  any  model  that does not accurately  specify  the 
automatic  effects  may become  biased  for that reason.  Indeed,  that might 
conceivably  account  for the peculiar  finding  of the St. Louis model that 
expenditures  are  a better  fiscal  variable  than  the full employment  surplus  or 
any other  variable  that  reflects  tax changes.  Furthermore,  Solow suggested 
that monetary  and fiscal policy makers  might manage  in some ways on 
some  occasions  to offset  contemporaneous  shifts  from  private  demand  even 
if they did not systematically  behave  according  to any reaction  function. 
Such  unsystematic  actions  would  be enough  to make  the policy variables 
correlated  with  the error  terms  in private  demand  equations. 
Solow also wanted  to tone down  William  Poole's  emphasis  on accurate 
prediction  as a test of the adequacy  of a model.  Solow  drew  an analogy  to 
Ptolemaic  astronomy,  which  predicted  reasonably  well in many  areas  but 
was still an incorrect  theory.  Poole agreed  that prediction  is not all that 
matters,  but suggested  that  it was one of the tests  that any adequate  model 
ought to be able to pass. David Fand noted that the converse  of Solow's 
point was that a reduced-form  model might  conceivably  predict  well and 
even  serve  as a useful  guide  to policy  for some  purposes,  even  though  it de- 
scribed  the economic process incorrectly.  Fand also suggested  that the 
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ulated  in models  (and  perhaps  not even observable  at all) were  relevant  to 
all forms  of econometric  work,  not merely  to reduced  forms. 
Solow  and  Franco  Modigliani  suggested  that  the most  important  specific 
issue of the paper  is the attempt  to understand  why fiscal  policy seems  so 
impotent  in the St. Louis and other  reduced-form  models.  Modigliani  re- 
ported  on an experiment  that has now been  performed  with four different 
econometric  models,  all of which  contain  substantial  effects  of fiscal  policy 
in their  structural  equations.  In each  experiment,  data are generated  for a 
world  that  is accurately  described  by one of these  models,  and  then  a simple 
reduced-form  regression  equation  is fitted  to the fiscal  and monetary  vari- 
ables.  In every  case,  the fiscal  multipliers  tend  to be substantially  underesti- 
mated  while  the monetary  multipliers  come out about  right.  Several  differ- 
ent types  of correlations  among  variables  and  with  time  seem  to contribute 
to this result; one-but  only one-element is the feedback  of economic 
conditions  on fiscal  policy  that  Goldfeld  and  Blinder  analyzed.  Poole  asked 
whether  the reverse  could  not also occur:  If one specified  a world  where  fis- 
cal policy  had no impact  on GNP, could  problems  of statistical  estimation 
incorrectly  yield a positive  fiscal  multiplier?  Modigliani  agreed  that could 
happen  in principle;  but  he emphasized  that  his convictions  on the presence 
of fiscal  effects  rested  on basic  theoretical  and  microeconomic  evidence  and 
not merely  on time  series  findings.  Moreover,  Modigliani  contended  that  he 
found  it difficult  to conceive  of a theoretically  plausible  model  of economic 
activity  that would not produce  some fiscal impact at least on nominal 
GNP. 
Goldfeld  responded  to Kareken's  skepticism  about  the existence  of fiscal 
reaction  functions.  He pointed out that statistical  estimation  problems 
would arise  even if only one of the stabilization  authorities  were  using a 
reaction  function  or in any way behaving  endogenously  while the other 
behaved  entirely  exogenously.  Replying  to Poole's  comments  on specifica- 
tion errors,  Goldfeld  and  Blinder  suggested  that  the first  basic  question  was 
whether  reduced-form  estimation  created  problems  when policy reaction 
functions  existed,  even  if the specification  of the rest  of the model  was pre- 
cisely accurate.  Thus  the authors  had fitted  the exact  reduced  form of the 
Moroney-Mason  model  in their  paper.  In that  sense,  neither  the structural 
nor the reduced-form  approach  had contained  specification  errors.  Once 
that question  is answered,  it becomes  important  to ask where  specification 
errors  are likely to arise and how serious  they may be. The paper had 
touched  on that issue  by investigating  a few cases of omitted  variables  for 
both the structural  and  the reduced-form  approach. 